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It was with mild amusement that I regarded the general upheaval and animosity of so many in
the MCom Tax class at UCT, colleagues at PwC Tax Services and the general tax community at a
seminar presented by Adv. EB Broomberg SC in Cape Town on a wet June evening – all because
of the renowned NWK-case.
Only after studying the judgment myself (and the subsequent media release by SARS), did I
realise what so many had feared would emanate from this judgment: ‘the slippery slope’ to
which Adv. TS Emslie SC refers in one of his articles quoted below.
This paper is a humble attempt at more clearly providing guidance on the principle of
simulation, both theoretically and practically.
Of course, this could not have been possible without the constant guidance of so many
colleagues, of which De Wet de Villiers requires special mention, as well as my supervisor at the
UCT Commerce Faculty, Prof. Jennifer Roeleveld. Also PwC Tax Services which financed the
project deserves recognition. And of course thank you to the ‘wielder of the red pen’, Mrs
Annetjie van Jaarsveld, for teaching English, debating and so much more for all those many
years.
Finally, special thanks is owed to my ever-supporting wife, Esri, without whose help and

















‘There is no equity about tax.’
Lord Cairns in Partington v Attorney General (1869) LR 4 HL 100
‘... nor, I would add, complete rationality.’















The simulation doctrine has, in the law of taxation, always played the role of being SARS’
remedy in the common law, vis-à-vis its legislated cohorts, viz. both the specific and general
anti-avoidance provisions contained in the various tax statutes.
Building on the principles established in Zandberg v Van Zyl, Dadoo Ltd and others v
Krugersdorp Municipal Council and Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles Brothers &
Hudson Ltd, the test which emerged and has been applied since, is broadly recognised as being
that as formulated by Watermeyer JA in Randles, being that where the parties to a contract
truly intended to act in accordance with the tenor of the agreement, irrespective of what their
purpose for entering into that transaction was, that contract cannot be a simulated one.
However, the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment in CSARS v NWK Ltd has necessitated that the
principles applied previously be revisited academically to determine whether the doctrine for
determining whether a simulation is present has changed – and if so, to what extent. Some
argue that the comments in NWK, which is perceived to have changed the simulation test, were
merely part of the obiter of the judgment, though they hasten to add that this does not mean
that such comments are void of import where lower courts may consider the doctrine in future.
Opposed hereto are those who are of the view that the judgment has indeed changed the
simulation doctrine’s landscape.
In this paper it is concluded that the correct position is probably aligned to the latter group.
This is not to opine whether the test is correct or not, but merely to comment on the outcome.
It is submitted that from an honest reading of NWK, the test for whether a simulation has been
present, is whether the parties to a contract did not honestly intend to give effect thereto in
accordance with its tenor, OR where either of the parties entered into such agreement with a
concealed purpose or motive. The extended test is therefore not just limited to whether a
simulated intention is present for both parties to the contract, but whether either of the parties
also exhibits a simulated purpose. Both the intention of the parties and the purpose of any one
of them should be determined subjectively, which is only possible through the use of objective
indicators which are available to a court for consideration.
Further investigation shows that this divergence from the test (which has been applied in South
Africa for more or less 70 years) has also been an approach which has been considered by other
countries, and comments by the various judiciaries indicate that some of the foreign benches
may agree with the newly established NWK test. However, for the moment the simulation test














From the developed principles of the simulation doctrine, it is evident that SARS may now have
a much more powerful weapon at its disposal, and taxpayers and –planners alike should take
cognisance of this. Especially when one compares the requirements of the common law
doctrine to the requirements for the general anti-avoidance rule, one realises that, where the
facts allow therefore, SARS may now attack a transaction or arrangement in terms of simulation
where previously this would not have been possible.
Finally, it is submitted that irrespective of whether the test for simulations has changed, the
latest developments in NWK (and internationally) are bound to affect tax planning, and prudent
tax planners should take note of the possible mutations thereof which may arise as a result. As
a result of the considerable amount of uncertainty that has arisen since, it is recommended that
specific transactions be reconsidered by tax planners, and that both SARS – and the Bench at
the first available opportunity – give clarity on whether it agrees with the assertions which have
been discussed in this paper and other published academic works.
Keywords
Australia, Canada, commercial substance, common law, GAAR, general anti-avoidance rule,
income tax, Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, intention, Lewis, NWK, plus valet quod agitur quam
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In the classic Greek legend of ‘the Sword of Damocles’, Cicero tells the story of young
Damocles, courtier to King Dionysius II of Syracuse. Damocles, being a true flatterer of nature
and employ, would constantly remind the King of his great fortunes and power by ruling over
his kingdom. Growing weary of Damocles’ constant pandering, the King invited Damocles to a
banquet to show him the true enjoyment of being a ruler. Damocles was even to sit on the
King’s throne. However, to Damocles’ horror, the King, to demonstrate the constant dangers
that a ruler faces amidst his fortunes and happiness, ordered a sword to be suspended from the
roof over Damocles’ head for the entire banquet, hanging by a single hair from a horse’s tail.1
Such were the perils of ruling in Greek mythology, and such is the nature of flaunting with
simulated transactions in the tax arena.
1.1 General comments
It is trite that the principle of simulation is not the fiefdom of the law of taxation only. However,
for purposes of this paper, the development of this doctrine within the borders of the law of
taxation exclusively, will be examined.
In his judgment in CoT v Ferera2 at 70, MacDonald JP comments as follows:
‘I endorse the opinion expressed that the avoidance of tax is an evil. Not only does it
mean that a taxpayer escapes the obligation of making his proper contribution to the
fiscus, but the effect must necessarily be to cast an additional burden on taxpayers who,
imbued with a greater sense of civic responsibility, make no attempt to escape or,
lacking the financial means to obtain the advice and set up the necessary tax-avoidance
machinery, fail to do so. Moreover, the nefarious practice of tax avoidance arms
opponents of our capitalistic society with potent arguments that it is only the rich, the
astute and the ingenious who prosper in it and that “good citizens” will always fare
badly. While undoubtedly the short term effects of the practice are serious, the long
term effects could be even more so.’
1 Damocles. Dictionary.com. Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition. 2009. HarperCollins
Publishers. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Damocles (accessed: March 19, 2012).














In contrast to this is the judgment of Lord Tomlin in IRC v Duke of Westminster:3
‘Every man is entitled, if he can, to so order his affairs so that the tax attaching under
the appropriate Acts is less than it would otherwise be. If he succeeds in ordering them
so as to secure this result, then, however unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland
Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay
an increased tax.’
Generally speaking, in the tax milieu, it is where this ‘ordering of affairs’ take on proportions
where a transaction is entered into: not so much to order affairs as to obtain some tax benefit,
and obtaining this tax benefit so by dishonestly displaying the transaction to the world in a form
which in substance it truthfully is not. Although not endorsing the view taken in Ferera as
quoted above, one must sympathise and agree that tax avoidance obtained through dishonest
means must be prohibited.
This prohibition is enforced through both the common law, as well as through legislation
enacted specifically to prevent, as National Treasury would have it, the ‘raiding of the fiscus’.
Although similarities with the general legislated provisions are also discussed, this paper deals
specifically with that common law arrow in the South African Revenue Service’s (‘SARS’) bow
i.e. preventing tax avoidance through the application of the simulation doctrine.
1.2 The scope of the simulation doctrine
The SA common law principle of simulation has over the years rested on two inter-dependent
pillars viz. the doctrines of ‘substance over form’ and so-called ‘sham’.4
The principle of ‘substance over form’ is embodied in the maxim ‘plus valet quod agitur quam
quod simulate concipitur maxim’ (the ‘plus valet’-rule) i.e. the true intention is of more value
than the pretence/sham5 (see Zandberg v Van Zyl).6 In this regard, Emslie points out that:
‘the language of “substance and form” is sometimes used by our courts to signify an
appropriate legal test in two different situations, namely simulated (or sham)
transactions, which involve dishonesty, and bona fide transactions which are
nevertheless construed in accordance with their substance rather than their form (for
3 [1936] AC 1–19.
4 Du Plessis, F. An unpublished and untitled article, used with permission of the author, discussing the principles of
plus valet and fraus legis.
5 Hiemstra & Gonin, Engels-Afrikaanse Regswoordeboek, 1963.














example, because the parties have in good faith but mistakenly attached the wrong
label thereto).’7
The principle of ‘sham’ in turn is embodied in the phrase ‘in fraudem legis’, (see Dadoo Ltd and
others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council)8 which, directly translated, means an act of evasion of
the law or of an act.9 Therefore, enjoined, it can be stated that where simulation occurs, the
true intention of parties is of more importance than the fraudulent form with which the evasion
of the provisions of an act is sought. ‘Simulation’ as discussed in this paper will therefore only
refer to the former of Emslie’s two situations above, i.e. dishonest simulation or simulation by
way of sham transactions.10
1.3 Purpose of the research
The purpose of this paper is to explore the history of law, and as it currently stands, regarding
what simulated transactions entail when used to reduce a taxpayer’s income tax obligation
when party to such a transaction(s). This paper addresses what currently constitutes simulation
in the context of South African tax law, and commentary is offered on the consequences that
this may hold for both the taxpayer and SARS in the future. To this extent, the research in this
paper has been divided into three parts, viz. the history and development of the simulation
doctrine, what this doctrine is currently defined as – both domestically and in other international
jurisdictions – and, finally, what the consequences of the current developments of this legal
principle may be in the future.
1.4 Methodology and structure
This research, which is Doctrinal in nature, has been conducted by studying and discussing
various sources of literature, the writings of experts in the field and in particular case law which
has led to the development of the simulation principle. From these sources deductive reasoning
has been applied in order to offer what the simulation doctrine encompasses in a short but
coherent and structured manner.11
In looking to the development of the simulation principle, this paper clarifies what the extended
common law test for simulation was, based on the above-mentioned principles of ‘substance
7 Emslie, T. Simulated Transactions – A new approach? The Taxpayer, January 2011, Vol. 60 No. 1.
8 [1920] AD 530.
9 Hiemstra & Gonin supra.
10 It is useful in this regard to refer to ‘bona fide or honest simulations’ not as ‘simulations’ per se. Surtees &
Millard choose to rather refer to this as the ‘label principle’ (SA Accountancy November/December 2004). It is
submitted that the correct approach would be for ‘simulations’ to include as one of its essentialia an element of
dishonesty or deceit. Refer in this regard to the discussion on the judgment in Zandberg infra at 2.1.














over form’ and ‘sham’, what it currently is, and how this will practically affect transactions
where our courts will in future adjudicate matters where tax avoidance through simulation is
involved. A conclusion is reached by discussing past judgments in Chapter 2, and evaluating
the evolution of the simulation doctrine with particular reference in Chapter 3 to the most recent
Supreme Court of Appeal decision (CSARS v NWK Ltd)12 (‘NWK’) which addressed the matter.
NWK is of particular importance both because it is the most recent authority on the matter, but
further since it has drawn a significant amount of comment. Particularly, it is perceived at first
glance at least to have had an astonishing disregard for the stare decisis principle. This
impression is created by the Supreme Court of Appeal which, in delivering its judgment, seems
to have unceremoniously cast aside judicial precedent set down by itself over just about 70
years. Centre to this is the perceived extension of one of the pillars of ‘simulation’, being the
‘plus valet’-rule referred to above, giving the test for simulation a distinct purposive (and
objective) approach, as opposed to having regard to the intention (which is determined
subjectively) of the parties involved, as a qualifying criterion to be satisfied. The source of this
sentiment is derived from the following passage from NWK:
‘The test should thus go further ... if (a transaction) has the purpose of tax evasion13
(sic)..., then it will be regarded as simulated’.14
In an attempt to consider how the doctrine of simulation is to be applied in the future, it is
further considered whether certain comments made in NWK were defining, in that they may
have changed the well established common law principles developed thus far. Whether these
comments constituted the ratio decidendi of the judgment or whether they were merely made
as obiter dictum by the learned judge in the case is also considered at length.
Irrespective of the conclusion reached in this regard, the effect thereof on the common law is
considered, as well as the impact that it may have on judgments to be made by lower courts in
the future, bearing consideration to the principle of stare decisis and that even obiter comments
made by the Supreme Court of Appeal would still carry persuasive weight in a lower court.15
Based on NWK, an evaluation into the current contents of the simulation principle will be
conducted, and this will be compared to the approach that other jurisdictions have taken
towards simulation in income tax. In Chapter 4, the position and principles regarding tax
avoidance by way of simulation is considered from an international perspective. For instance, it
12 [2010] 73 SATC 55.
13 In this regard, it is commonly regarded that Lewis, JA intended to use the word ‘avoidance’ instead of ‘evasion’
and that this was a mere ‘slip of the judicial pen’ (Emslie infra at 177). Not that this will rectify the uncertainty
created. Refer in this regard also to Emslie supra at 7, Vorster infra at 38 and Broomberg infra at 34. It may be
that the confusion regarding ‘evasion’ may have arisen through SARS’ insistence that additional tax of 200% be
levied as it contended NWK intentionally ‘evaded’ tax through the series of transactions. Refer in this regard to the
Respondent’s Heads of Argument at Appendix 1, as well as to the court a quo judgment in ITC1833 [2008] 70
SATC 238 at 16 and 70.1.















has been proposed that tax avoidance (through the application of the simulation doctrine) be
defined as:
‘the intention (motive, purpose, aim) to obtain a tax advantage contrary to the purpose
of the norm, despite formally adhering to its wording’.16
Alternatively:
‘I apprehend that, if it has any meaning in law, (sham) means acts done or documents
executed by the parties to the “sham” which are intended by them to give to third
parties or to the court the appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and
obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if any) which the
parties intend to create... (F)or acts or documents to be a “sham”, with whatever legal
consequences follow from this, all the parties thereto must have a common intention
that the acts or documents are not to create the legal rights and obligations which they
give the appearance of creating. No unexpressed intentions of a “shammer” affect the
rights of a party whom he deceived.’17
The purpose of an international comparison is two-fold: firstly to attempt to draw a comparison
between the perceived new approach taken by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the NWK-case
(especially given the purposive approach taken), and secondly to determine whether there may
be lessons to learn in developing our own common law, and what similarities already exist.
Specifically, the jurisdictions of the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada have been chosen, as
these all have developed, as part of their common law, anti-avoidance mechanisms. In
addition, these countries also share their legal developmental background, as does South Africa,
from the British Common Law system as a basis from which these mechanisms were developed.
In reaching a conclusion to the possible effect of the test for simulation adopted in NWK, specific
transactions are considered in Chapter 5 and how the latest developments to the simulation
doctrine may impact on these, e.g. the acquisition of shares through debt financing by
employing group relief provisions contained in the Income Tax Act18 (‘the Act’, and all
references to ‘section’ are to the relevant sections of the Act).
Finally, simulation will be discussed and considered within the context of the General Anti
Avoidance Rules (‘GAAR’) introduced into the Act on 2 November 2006, and whether these, at
least to some extent, address the simulation principle which has, until now, been addressed by
the common law. Specifically, the notion of ‘commercial substance’ as envisaged in section 80C
16 Karimeri, R. A Critical Review of the Definition of Tax Avoidance in the Case Law of the European Court of
Justice, Intertax, June 2011, Vol. 39 Issue 6/7.
17 Diplock, L.J. in Snook v London & Westriding Investments [1967] 2 QB 786.














will be considered and whether there may be some overlapping between this and the approach
in the common law, especially given the curious choice of words used by the court in NWK.
1.5 Limitations to the study
The GAAR will not be discussed in any detail, but will only be alluded to as is necessary for the
subject area. As noted above in 1.2 simulation is only discussed in the context of sham
transactions and dishonest simulation.

















The decisions in Zandberg, Dadoo and Randles Brothers
The principle of simulation has been developed by a host of well known, and often quoted,
cases. The judgments of the former Appellate Division (now the Supreme Court of Appeal) in
Zandberg v Van Zyl19, Dadoo Ltd and others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council20 and
Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles Brothers & Hudson Ltd21 bear particular
reference in that they set the basis upon which the doctrine of ‘simulation’ was developed.
These cases are considered below in more detail in order to determine what the crisp test for
simulation was clear to be, prior to the confusion emanating as a result of the NWK-judgment.22
It is acknowledged that the development of the simulation principle cannot be attributed solely
to these three cases discussed. However, in the interest of not labouring unnecessarily on the
history of the doctrine, other cases which had a role to play in the establishment of ‘simulated
transaction’ are referred to in this chapter and throughout this paper.23 It is submitted though
that the three cases discussed in this chapter laid the foundation for the development of the
doctrine, which is reason enough for their facts and judgments to be revisited here again.
Up until the NWK judgment, the test for simulation developed by our courts (and applied by
courts in other common law jurisdictions as well, as discussed in chapter 4 infra) has been
based upon the maxim plus valet quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur24, and is probably
best formulated in Zandberg.
This subjective ‘standard test’25 seems to have been applied consistently over the years in
determining whether transactions were simulated to obtain a tax benefit.
However, it needs to be investigated whether this position may have been altered by the NWK-
judgment, as alluded to in Chapter 1 above, by introducing an objective element to the test:
‘The test should thus go further, and require an examination of the commercial sense of
the transaction: of its real substance and purpose.’ (own emphasis)
19 Ibid. at 6.
20 Ibid. at 8.
21 [1941] 33 SATC 48.
22 As an aside, it is interesting to note that the notion of ‘ownership’ is a common theme in all these and other loci
classici, ranging from the ownership of a wagon to textiles, from ownership of a loan to immovable property. Even
in the latest addition of NWK, ownership of maize was centre to the issue at hand (at 76).
23 The judgments which particularly deserve mention in this regard (in chronological order) are Vasco Dry Cleaners
v Twycross [1979] 1 All SA 321 (A), Hippo Quaries (Tvl) (Pty) Ltd v Eardley 1992 (1) SA 867 (AD), Erf 3183/1
Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd and another v CIR [1996] 58 SATC 229 and CIR v Conhage (Proprietary) Limited [1999] 61
SATC 391.
24 De Koker & Brinckler, Silke on International Tax, 2010: 46.5.














2.1 Zandberg v Van Zyl
The first South African case to truly deal with the principle of ‘simulation’ was that of Zandberg.
It will be noted from the title of the case that this is not a tax case – however, the reader is
reminded that ‘simulation’ is not the property of the law of taxation only.
The respondent was in the unenviable position of having his mother-in-law, one Mrs van Zyl, as
a debtor. Mrs van Zyl was not only indebted to her son-in-law, but also to the appellant. Of
contention in the matter was a wagon which the Messenger of the Court had attached as
payment for the debt owing to the appellant. However, according to the respondent, Mrs van
Zyl had already sold him this wagon in consideration for a loan of £50 which he had previously
extended to her, and as such the wagon was not the property of Mrs van Zyl and it could
therefore not be attached for the payment of her debts.
The appellant contended that the wagon was not sold to the respondent, but that he had merely
taken possession thereof as security for the amount owed to him by Mrs van Zyl. Accordingly,
the appellant was entitled to have the wagon attached in partial fulfilment of the amount
advanced to Mrs van Zyl, since the wagon was her property. If however Mrs van Zyl was not
the owner of the wagon, but rather the respondent, the appellant would not be entitled to take
the wagon for himself.
In a unanimous judgment, upholding the appeal, Innes, J. held at 309:
‘Not infrequently, however (either to secure some advantage which otherwise the law
would not give, or to escape some disability which otherwise the law would impose), the
parties to a transaction endeavour to conceal its real character. They call it by a name,
or give it a shape, intended not to express but to disguise its true nature. And when a
Court is asked to decide any rights under such an agreement, it can only do so by giving
effect to what the transaction really is: not what in form it purports to be. The maxim
then applies plus valet quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur. But the words of the
rule indicate its limitations. The Court must be satisfied that there is a real intention,
definitely ascertainable, which differs from the simulated intention. For if the parties in
fact mean that a contract shall have effect in accordance with its tenor, the
circumstances that the same object might have been attained in another way will not
necessarily make the arrangement other than it purports to be. The enquiry, therefore,















From this celebrated extract, it is evident that a mismatch between the substance and form of
an agreement by itself is not enough to pierce the ‘contractual veil’.26 By using words such as
‘disguise’ and ‘simulated intention’, intent to deceive is of primary importance to the learned
judge. This extract, and case, laid the basis for a subjective test to be applied in determining
whether a simulated transaction has been entered into. And ‘simulated’ in Zandberg would
have to be something which intently has been designed to take the form of something which the
substance of is not.
It would seem, from the above, that ‘simulation’ as developed in Zandberg would exclude bona
fide transactions where ‘the parties have in good faith but mistakenly attached the wrong label
thereto’. The inappropriate form of a transaction is not enough to render a transaction
‘simulated’ for the purposes of the common law – intent would be a necessary requirement.27+28
2.2 Dadoo Ltd and others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council
Whereas Zandberg proved to be the first South African authority on ‘substance over form’,
Dadoo serves as the leading authority on the ‘in fraudem legis’-principle. The facts are shortly
as follows:
In terms of now repealed statute, persons of Asiatic descent were prohibited to acquire land in
the Krugersdorp Municipal district. The appellant company was incorporated to acquire land in
the district. Both its shareholders, Messrs Dadoo and Dindar, both of whom were of Asiatic
origin, were the sole shareholders of the appellant.
The respondent Municipal Council approached the then Transvaal Provincial Division, seeking
and successfully obtaining an order to set aside the transfer of property acquired by the
appellant on the basis that the transaction was one which was in fraudem legis. To this, the
appellants appealed to the Appellate Division.
In delivering the majority judgment (Innes, CJ writing a separate concurring judgment and De
Villiers JA dissenting), Solomon JA, in reference to the extent of the doctrine of in fraudem legis
held at 558:
‘The law on this subject is based mainly upon two leges of the Digest, 1.3.29 & 30, which
read as follows:- “29. Contra legem facit, qui id facit quod lex prohibet, in fraudem vero,
qui salvis verbis legis sententiam eius circumvenit. 30. Fraus enim legi fit, ubi quod fieri
26 Refer to Kilburn v Estate Kilburn 1931 AD 501 at 507 where Wessels ACJ held: ‘Courts of law will not be
deceived by the form of a transaction: it will rend aside the veil in which the transaction is wrapped and examine
its true nature and substance.’
27 Du Plessis supra.














noluit, fieri autem non vetuit, id fit: et quod distat dictum a sententia, hoc distat fraus ab
eo, quod contra legem fit.”29
Now it has already been pointed out that in interpreting a statute a court is entitled to
have regard not only to the words used by the Legislature but also to its object and
policy. But clearly more than that is embraced in these two leges. Indeed, at first sight it
would almost appear as if it were intended to lay down that a court may construe a
statute so extensively as to declare invalid an act which, though it did not contravene the
prohibition of the law, nevertheless did violence to its spirit and intent. If that were the
correct meaning of these two leges it would in effect enable a court of justice to legislate
by supplying what it conceived to be omissions of the Legislature. Such an authority,
however, has never, so far as I know, been claimed by the courts of this country, and an
examination of the examples referred to in the Digest, in which these leges were applied
in practice shows, I think, conclusively that this is not what was meant by their authors,
but that all that they intended to lay down was that where a statute prohibits anything
being done, the law cannot be circumvented by the doing of that act in an indirect
manner. These rules, indeed, are, in my opinion, merely an application of a general
principle, which is as much a part of English as of Roman Jurisprudence, that courts
should have regard to the substance rather than to the form of a transaction, and should
strip off any disguise which is intended to conceal its real nature’. (own emphasis)
And later at 560:
‘It is perfectly legitimate, however, for persons to evade a statute by deliberately
keeping outside of its provisions and by doing something which effects their purpose
equally well, but without bringing themselves within the scope of the law’. (own
emphasis)
A reading of the above extract shows that the test for ‘simulation’ is now developed not
necessarily further, but has at least been more refined: Not only is a mismatch between the
substance and form of a transaction required, but also the intentional disguise thereof as
primary reason for moulding the transaction in that particular form.30
29 Translated (by Prof. AH van Wyk) in Afrikaans, and by the author into English for purposes of this paper: ‘Dig.
1.3.29. A person does something that is contrary to the law, if he does that which the law prohibits. Nonetheless
he does it fraudulently if he, within the wording of the law, circumvents the purpose of the law. Dig. 1.3.30. A
fraud is committed against the law if that which it did not want to occur, but that which he did not prohibit to occur,
in fact does occur: and the farther that which is said/determined is from the purpose, the farther that which is
done contrary to the law is from fraud.’
30 This principle has been applied in both CIR v Conhage (Proprietary) Limited at 1 as well as in Erf 3183/1
Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd and another v CIR at 950I-952C: ‘Within the bounds of any anti-avoidance provisions in the
relevant legislation, a taxpayer may minimise his tax liability by arranging his affairs in a suitable manner. If eg the
same commercial result can be achieved in different ways, he may enter into the type of transaction which does














Of further interest are Solomon JA’s comments regarding the interpretation of statutes.
Although it supports the so-called ‘purposive’ approach to the interpretation of statutes, it also
places a clear border to the proverbial field of play within which it operates: a court may not
write statutes, but that which is written may be applied in the manner which has been intended
by the Legislature.31 This proves to be a double-edged sword: courts have the power to look
beyond what is strictly determined by statute, but this ability would also have to be practiced
with disciplined restraint.
In this regard, the following dictum from Vestey’s (Lord) Executors & another v IRC32 at 1120
bears reference:
‘Parliament in its attempts to keep pace with the ingenuity devoted to tax avoidance
may fall short of its purpose. That is a misfortune for the taxpayers who do not try to
avoid their share of the burden, and it is disappointing to the Inland Revenue. But the
court will not stretch the terms of taxing Acts in order to improve on the efforts of
Parliament and to stop gaps which are left open by the statutes. Tax avoidance is an
evil, but it would be the beginning of much greater evils if the courts were to
overstretch the language of the statute in order to subject to taxation people of whom
they disapproved’.
On a practical level, this becomes increasingly difficult when dealing with the interpretation of
law in terms of the amorphous rules of the common law. However, one would expect courts to
exercise the same degree of restraint in interpreting the common law as would be the case in
interpreting statutes. Courts should exercise discipline in not using the common law as a
legislative pen in its hands. This is at the very heart of the rule of law.
2.3 Commissioner of Customs and Excise v Randles Brothers & Hudson Ltd
The respondent company was the importer of materials to be used in clothing. On the import of
its products, the company received a rebate from customs duty since the company met the
requirement that the goods were after import given to a manufacturer who manufactured
clothing from the materials provided. Thereafter the finished goods were handed back to the
respondent for sale into the market. For the manufacturing of the clothing from the
respondent’s materials, the respondent paid the manufacturer a fee. It is important to note
that at no point did the ownership of the materials during this period pass to the manufacturer.
Later, in 1936, the requirements for receiving the rebate from customs duty were changed. To
qualify for the rebate under the new regulations, the importer had to also be the manufacturer
31 De Koker & Brinckler, Silke on International Tax, 2010: 46.3.














of the finished clothing goods. As the respondent was still enthusiastic to draw advantage from
the customs rebate, he varied his agreement with the manufacturers. In terms of the new
agreement, the manufacturers would purchase the uncut materials from the respondent and
manufacture this into the clothing required by the respondent. The finished products would be
sold back to the respondent at cost price plus a margin for the labour which the manufacturer
had incurred. In addition, the respondent contracted with the manufacturers that they were not
required to pay for the materials purchased until the articles of clothing were purchased back
from them by the respondent (the risk of not selling any products was therefore removed – a
risk normally associated with any retailer of tangible goods).
It was contended for the Commissioner that Randles Brothers & Hudson Ltd was still the true
importer of the textiles, and that the transactions had been varied in fraudem legis to, in form,
show the manufacturers as the importers of the materials, where in actual fact ownership had
never passed to them.
The bench was split three to two in the matter. Watermeyer JA, in delivering the majority
judgment and dismissing the appeal, referred as follows to the judgment in Zandberg at 395 to
396:
‘I wish to draw particular attention to the words "a real intention, definitely
ascertainable, which differs from the simulated intention" because they indicate clearly
what the learned Judge meant by a "disguised" transaction. A transaction is not
necessarily a disguised one because it is devised for the purpose of evading the
prohibition in the Act or avoiding liability for the tax imposed by it. A transaction devised
for that purpose, if the parties honestly intend it to have effect according to its tenor, is
interpreted by the Courts according to its tenor, and then the only question is whether,
so interpreted, it falls within or without the prohibition or tax.
A disguised transaction in the sense in which the words are used above is something
different. In essence it is a dishonest transaction: dishonest, in as much as the parties
to it do not really intend it to have, inter partes the legal effect which its terms convey
to the outside world. The purpose of the disguise is to deceive by concealing what is the
real agreement or transaction between the parties. The parties wish to hide the fact that
their real agreement or transaction falls within the prohibition or is subject to the tax,
and so they dress it up in a guise which conveys the impression that it is outside of the
prohibition or not subject to the tax. Such a transaction is said to be in fraudem legis,
and is interpreted by the Courts in accordance with what is found to be the real
agreement or transaction between the parties.
Of course, before the Court can find that a transaction is in fraudem legis in the above
sense, it must be satisfied that there is some unexpressed agreement or tacit
understanding between the parties. If this were not so, it could not find that the
ostensible agreement is a pretence. The blurring of this distinction between an honest














the prohibitory or taxing provisions of a statute but disguised to make it appear as if it
does not, gives rise to much of the confusion which sometimes appears to accompany
attempts to apply the maxim quoted above.’
This majority judgment is a ringing endorsement of the test for ‘simulation’ laid down by the
Appellate Division in Dadoo, with perhaps one further development: a mismatch between the
substance and form of a transaction is required as a result of the intentional disguise thereof as
reason for moulding the transaction in that particular form, and that intention must be present
for both parties to the transaction (i.e. an element of collusion).33 It is worth noting that
Watermeyer JA seems to exclude the ‘primary purpose’-requirement, as quoted at 560 in Dadoo
above, i.e. even if the sole purpose of a transaction is the avoidance of tax, this will not be
simulation if the parties intend to act in accordance with its tenor.34+35
De Wet CJ for the dissenting minority held that for ownership to pass through a contract of sale,
both the purchaser and the seller had to intend this to in fact take place. If this intention was
absent in either party, no actual contract of sale was concluded. Even though it may be so that
the respondent actually intended to sell the materials to the manufacturers, there existed no
intention or animus emendi from the manufacturers to acquire ownership of the materials
imported.
As discussed infra at 3.2.1, the NWK-judgment36 seeks to draw a distinction between the
different approaches taken by Watermeyer JA and De Wet CJ – the latter preferring to adopt a
more objective approach as compared to the subjective approach followed by Watermeyer JA.37
Without pausing unnecessarily at this point, it is submitted that one could agree with Vorster’s
submission that in actual fact, there is no real difference in approach adopted by either judge,
other than on matters of fact.38 However, it is submitted that the added requirement of
Watermeyer JA, i.e. that both parties to the transactions seek to intentionally conceal the true
nature thereof, was indeed a new development in law at the time and a new consideration
added to matters raised in previous precedent in considering matters of simulation.
33 Although the cases do not directly relate to one another, the notion of multi-party conspiracy has subsequently
been endorsed by the internationally recognised authoritative (refer Raftland at 115 and 116 ibid. at 118)
judgment on the matter in Snook (ibid. at 17): ‘For acts or documents to be a “sham”, with whatever legal
consequences follow from this, all the parties thereto must have a common intention that the acts or documents
are not to create the legal rights and obligations which they give the appearance of creating.’ (own emphasis)
34 Broomberg, E.B. 2011. The Founders Hill and NWK cases under the spotlight. Comment on CSARS v NWK Ltd
(27/10) [2010] ZASCA 168, Cape Town, 30 August 2011. Cape Town: South African Fiscal Association.
35 It is submitted that ‘for parties to intend to give effect to a contract in accordance with its tenor’, can also be
translated into ‘the parties intending, however difficult it is to subjectively determine, to honour the maxim pacta
servanda sunt (i.e. contracts should be honoured)’. For a further brief discussion on the application of the law of
contract to simulated transactions, refer to Chapter 3.2 infra.
36 At 47 and 48.
37 As also referred to in Vasco Dry Cleaners v Twycross [1979] 1 All SA 321 (A) at 334(2).















THE PRESENT – SOUTH AFRICA
The decision in NWK
As alluded to above, NWK has the potential (whether applied, distinguished or differed from in
cases to follow) to be a landmark decision in the development of the simulation doctrine.
However, it is yet to be considered by another court and until then, its full impact remains open
for speculation. Accordingly, it is compelling to pause sufficiently at this point to dissect the
judgment in NWK in some detail so as to better understand the issues and considerations at
hand and how they are likely to be applied and interpreted in future. This is necessitated by the
outcry from the larger tax community over the judgment, as well as credence and much
influence given to certain comments by the court in the judgment, even if made in passing and
as part of obiter, through the principles of stare decisis.
A study of the judgment is therefore essential for two reasons: the first being that, from a
theoretical angle, one is required to determine how (if so) the judgment altered the position of
‘simulation’ in South African tax law. The second is that, even if no such alteration has taken
place, what the practical effect of the judgment will be.
3.1 The NWK-case39
The case came before the Supreme Court of Appeal as an appeal by the Commissioner for SARS
(for ease of reference hereinafter referred to as ‘SARS’) against an appeal upheld by the Tax
Court sitting in Johannesburg. The appeal was brought before the Tax Court by NWK against
certain assessments issued to it. At issue was whether interest payments claimed as deductions
by the respondent (NWK) for the 1999 to 2003 years of assessment should be permitted.
SARS, having originally allowed the deductions, issued revised assessments in 2003 in which it
disallowed interest on a portion of a loan which it regarded as simulated. In addition, it also
sought to levy interest and a 200% penalty.
SARS’ claim of a simulation was in respect of a loan granted to NWK, a maize trader, from
essentially First National Bank (‘FNB’). Before discussing the loan agreement, it is necessary to
appreciate that for the finance to be granted in the current case, no simple contract was entered
into between FNB and NWK to obtain the financing. In fact quite to the contrary, a range of
transactions and contracts40 were entered into between amongst others NWK and FNB to secure
the loan facility in question. The essential facts relating to the complex loan in question are as
follows:
39 The keen historian will note the interesting coincidence that the judgment in NWK was handed down 7 days short
of the centenary of the celebrated judgment of Innes, J quoted above in Zandberg v Van Zyl, seen by most to be
the first classical case on simulation.














Slab Trading Company (Pty) Ltd (‘Slab’), a subsidiary of FNB, lent NWK an amount of
R96,415,776 carrying interest at a fixed rate of 15.41% per annum, payable every six months.
For payment of the interest, Slab was issued 10 promissory notes with a total face value of
R74,686,861 by NWK. The capital was to be repaid at the end of the 5-year loan period by the
delivery of 109,315 tons of maize by NWK to Slab. NWK, to hedge against the exposure of the
risk in fluctuation in the maize price (according to testimony given on its behalf), contracted
with FNB to acquire the right to obtain the delivery of 109,315 tons of maize in 5 years’ time for
consideration amounting to R46,415,776 and payable immediately. Therefore, in 5 years, NWK
would both deliver and receive 109,315 tons of maize.
Slab now exits from the transaction: it sells its promissory notes received for the future interest
payments to FNB at its discounted value. It further also sells the right to receive the maize
from NWK to FNB (for a price being materially the same as the corresponding right was sold to
NWK above).
The net effect41 of the above for NWK was that it received a net amount from the FNB Group of
R50,000,000 and made 10 payments every six months (i.e. over five years) of R7,468,686
amounting to R74,686,861.
What the court found in substance to have taken place was that a loan of R50,000,000 was
made, to be repaid in equal instalments of R7,468,686 every 6 months for 5 years. The total
repayment over the 5 year term would amount to the payments above of R74,686,861, the
total amount of which was portrayed by the parties as interest. In actual fact, this amount
would however consist of the repayment of the R50,000,000 capital, as well as a fee of
R697,518 and interest of R23,989,343.42
While SARS allowed so much of the interest as would have been payable on a loan of
R50,000,000 as a section 11(a) deduction, i.e. R24,686,861 (the R697,518 fee + interest
R23,989,343), the amount disallowed was the interest charged on the loan amount exceeding
R50,000,000, as well as additional tax and interest.
Considering the above facts, one may be inclined to agree with Emslie43 that the above
transactions were tantamount to simulated transactions. The question of import is however,
how does one reach such a conclusion: by the consideration of objective or subjective
considerations?
41 The court held that, by operation of confusio, NWK’s obligation to both deliver and receive the same amount of
maize on 28 February 2003 was cancelled.
42 Refer NWK at 31, as well as par. 63 of the Head’s of Argument presented to the Supreme Court of Appeal by the
Appellant.














3.2 A new test?
3.2.1 Lewis JA’s test
According to Broomberg,44 the ‘Golden Rule’ with regards to simulation in South African tax law,
based upon the extract in Randles quoted above, is:
‘A transaction will not be regarded as simulated if the parties genuinely intended that
their contract will have effect in accordance with its tenor, and that the rule applies even
if the transaction is devised solely for the purpose of avoiding tax.’45
At first blush, this may seem to be unfairly prejudiced against SARS, especially if considered
that, on the strength of the above dictum, transactions devised with the sole purpose of
avoiding tax falls outside the perimeter of simulated transactions if it is acted on in accordance
with its tenor. However, one is reminded of the legislative protection that SARS is also afforded
in terms of GAAR in the Act at section 80A and 80L, which would be the corrective and an
additional remedy available to SARS if not able to rely on the common law.46
At this point it would be appropriate to revisit what the common law test for simulation was as
concluded in Watermeyer JA’s judgment in Randles:47
1.The substance of a transaction must be different from the form in which it is cached;
2.There must exist an intention to have presented the transaction in the disguised form;
and
3.The intention referred to in 2. above must be present in both contracting parties.
In NWK, Lewis JA confirms that the principles (although in her mind not applied consistently in
past judgments) that, on the one hand, a taxpayer may organise his financial affairs so as to
pay as little tax as possible and, that on the other hand, the true nature and substance of a
transaction is to be regarded by a court, are not in conflict.48 However, because of the
‘divergence’ in the application of the two principles, Lewis JA felt compelled to clarify what the
test for simulation should be.
According to the learned Judge, the best example of the two different approaches to balancing
the above two principles is found in the majority (delivered by Watermeyer JA) and minority
44 Ibid. at 34.
45 In this regard, it is interesting to note that the first form of GAAR was introduced into the Income Tax Act of
1941 in the form of section 90 – the same year that the Randles judgment was delivered.
46 For a more detailed comparison between the common law doctrine of simulation and the provisions of GAAR,
refer to Chapter 5.2.
47 Refer 2.3.














decisions (delivered by De Wet CJ with Tindall JA concurring in a separate judgment) of
Randles.
Referring to the test for simulation by Watermeyer JA (as set out above), the focal point of the
‘divergent’ application for Lewis JA seems to be the judge’s focus on the parties’ intention to
transfer ownership through contract of sale. The view expressed in NWK was that this test did
not go far enough.49 In this regard it is submitted that Lewis JA did not propose a ‘new’ test per
se, but rather sought to extend the test for simulation to ‘go further’. This is however discussed
in more detail infra at 3.3.
Juxtaposed to Watermeyer JA’s test is the judgment of De Wet CJ who ‘preferred to look at the
substance of what was done’, as well as that of Tindall JA, who ‘too considered that the court
should have regard to what was done rather than what was said.’50
Elaboration of and content to this extract is to be gleaned from what followed in NWK at 49 to
54, where various past judgments are quoted by Lewis JA in support of her assertion of past
divergence. These judgments, it was put by the court, followed the minority’s approach in
Randles.51 Instead of looking to the intention of the parties concerned, the court inferred that in
these cases the court rather had regard to other criteria to ascertain the purpose52 of the
transactions. In short, it was held by the court in NWK that:
 In Vasco Dry Cleaners, the features of the contract in question were considered;
 The court in Hippo Quarries considered the form in which the transaction had been
concluded and from there deduced whether the parties’ intention was in accordance
therewith;
 In Conhage ‘business sense’ was the overriding factor;
 The ‘purpose’ of the transaction was another important factor considered in Hippo
Quarries (a factor which was emphasised by the court in NWK); and
 Although in both the cases of Conhage and S v Friedman Motors (Pty) Ltd53 the intention
of the parties to perform in accordance with their tenor was present, there were sound
commercial reasons for structuring the transactions in the way they were.
49 At 55.
50 NWK at 48.
51 The correctness of this statement by the court has been questioned by Vorster (ibid. at 38). However, for
purposes of this paper, this will not be evaluated. The purpose of this paper is not to present a critical analysis on
NWK, but rather to ascertain what the court crisply decided the contents of ‘simulation’ should be, as well as to
venture an opinion on how this would be applied in future.
52 It should be pointed out that, in the tax milieu, the purpose which is scrutinised is specifically whether there is a
commercial purpose to the transaction, other than one of obtaining some tax advantage, this as tax invariably
occurs in the economic environment. It will be noted that throughout the contents of this paper, reference will
interchangeably be made by the writer or sources quoted to inter alia business purpose, commercial purpose,
commercial sense, economic purpose, etc. It is submitted that these are all various guises of the same
requirement as a potential objective test for simulated transactions.














It would be fair to say from a study of the above-mentioned examples that the full bench in
NWK clearly favoured a test different, or extended, from the one laid down in the majority
judgment in Randles. To summarise and conclude on the court’s view of what the test should
be for simulated transactions, Lewis JA comments as follows at 55 (a stark contrast to
Watermeyer JA’s judgment in Randles):
‘In my view the test to determine simulation cannot simply be whether there is an
intention to give effect to a contract in accordance with its terms. Invariably where
parties structure a transaction to achieve an objective other than the one ostensibly
achieved they will intend to give effect to the transaction on the terms agreed. The test
should thus go further, and require an examination of the commercial sense of the
transaction: of its real substance and purpose. If the purpose of the transaction is only
to achieve an object that allows the evasion (sic)54 of tax, or of a peremptory law, then
it will be regarded as simulated.’
It follows that the requirements set out by Lewis JA in NWK, which, after consideration of the
above, can only be interpreted as an endorsement of a purposive approach i.e. what the
purpose of the transaction was (as opposed to an analysis of the intentions of the parties
involved). Lewis JA’s test can therefore be paraphrased as follows:
1.The substance of the transactions must be different from the form in which it is cached;
2.The above substance must have the effect to avoid tax (or any other peremptory of law);
and
3.To obtain the above tax benefit must have been the purpose55 (albeit the primary
purpose)56 of entering into that transaction of at least one of the contracting parties.57
As submitted earlier, this does not encompass the entire test for simulation, but merely the
extension thereof. The test for simulation following from NWK is regarded in its entirety in
Chapter 3.3 below.
Perhaps, as a concluding remark on this point, it is necessary to state that many have lamented
the creation of a new and unjust so-called ‘deemed simulation’ (i.e. that requirement 3. above
54 Read ‘avoidance’.
55 It is conceded that, at 56, Lewis JA comments that it needs to be ascertained what the parties really ‘intended’ to
achieve. It is submitted that this is not a reference to the determination of the intention of the parties in binding
themselves contractually, but rather as a synonym for ‘purpose’ used loosely. This therefore does not serve as a
basis for arguing that Lewis JA through this dicta in fact did not choose to deviate from the test laid down in
Randles.
56 The requirement for the primary purpose to be the obtaining of a tax benefit will be discussed and substantiated
below under Chapter 4.1 and compared to the ‘sole or main purpose’ requirement of GAAR.
57 The requirement that the simulated purpose of only one of the contracting parties will be sufficient to create a














is sufficient under the ‘new’ test to create a simulation).58 Some have gone as far as to suggest
that, on the strength of the above quoted dictum, if a transaction is entered into with the
purpose of saving on tax, then it will be regarded as a simulated transaction. With respect, it
would seem that the fears of a ‘deemed simulation’ as described above and in the context of the
judgment are ill-founded.
Upon a closer reading of par. 55 of the judgment, one would notice Lewis JA using words such
as that the ‘test should go further’ and that one has to determine the ‘real substance’ of the
transaction. All of these are clear indicators that requirements 1. and 2. above are conceded to
be necessary requirements of the simulation test, and that Lewis JA has not, as many would
have it, thrown out the baby with the bath water.
3.2.2 The requirement for ‘intention’ or ‘purpose’
The seemingly opposing requirements of ‘intention’ and ‘purpose’ warrants further analysis.
How, one could ask, do these differ from another? In this regard, the dictum by Nienaber JA in
Hippo Quarries59, quoted by Lewis JA in NWK bears reference:
‘Motive and purpose differ from intention. If the purpose of the parties is unlawful,
immoral or against public policy the transaction will be ineffectual even if the intention
to cede is genuine. That is a principle of law. Conversely, if their intention to cede is not
genuine because the real purpose of the parties is something other than cession, their
ostensible transaction will likewise be ineffectual. That is because the law disregards
simulation. But where, as here, the purpose is legitimate and the intention is genuine,
such intention, all other things being equal, will be implemented.’ (emphasis supplied by
Lewis JA)
3.2.2.1Intention
‘Intention’ as used here is determined subjectively, and is one of the requirements for entering
into a contract.60 As an aside, no case law61 could be found, nor could a scenario be conceived,
where simulation can occur outside of the bounds of a contract. It is therefore submitted that
there can be no simulation without a contract to act as a vehicle through which that simulation
is carried out.
Simply put, a contract is an agreement between parties in which the creation of an obligation(s)
is intended, the basis of which is consensus between the contracting parties. This can be traced
58 Broomberg supra at 34.
59 At 405.
60 Van der Merwe et al, Contract General Principles, 2003: 1.3.1 & 2.1 – 2.3.
61 Even in Dadoo’s case, the relationship between company and shareholder is one of contract in so far as a
contract creates obligations to both parties – Dadoo is obliged to perform as instructed by its shareholders, who in














back to the Roman legal system where a meeting of intentions between contracting parties was
regarded as the basis of a legal contract. The elements of consensus, according to the Will
Theory,62 are:
a)Agreement on the consequences of the obligations created;
b)The intention by all parties concerned to be legally bound to the obligations in a); and
c) The parties must be aware of the agreement.63
When analysing the form of a contract to determine what rights and obligations are meant to be
created by it, a court has to determine what ‘type’ of contract it is dealing with. E.g. a contract
of sale generally gives the seller the right to receive payment, whilst it also incurs the obligation
to deliver the merx. In a contract of lease, the lessor retains the ownership of the merx, but
gives the right of use thereof to the lessee, in exchange for the right to receive lease payments.
In classifying a contract, regard must be had to the essentialia thereof. This should not be
mistaken as requirements for a contract, but rather as essential elements to the classification of
a contract, e.g. a contract of sale, lease or pledge. Still, it is possible for parties to a transaction
to phrase a contract in such a manner so that the essentialia thereof (and the ensuing naturalia
(terms attached by law to a contract) and incidentalia (further detailed terms, e.g. the method
of payment, which is attached to a contract)) is coloured in such a manner as to provide a guise
to the actual essentialia intended.64 In such a case, one would have the difficult task to
determine what the rights and obligations are which is created by a contract and which ‘type’ of
contract this would more closely resemble.
Furthermore, the parties to a contract may portray to the world in their agreement, which has
been reduced to writing, that it seeks to create rights and obligations which in actual fact they
have silently or secretly agreed it would in actual fact not. It is therefore necessary for a court
to determine in seeking to apply the ‘simulation’ principle, as envisaged by Watermeyer JA in
Randles, whether the parties to the contract have sought to be actually bound by the wording of
the contract inter partes, or whether a silent or tacit understanding existed between them that
they will not strictly keep one another to the terms thereof. And in a modern, commercial
society with unique rights and obligations being created or reserved, classifying contracts as a
certain ‘type’ of contract may not always be a simple task.
Therefore, a contract, stripped bare of its label and ‘outward trappings’65 (and even the writing
in which the agreement was purportedly recorded), if acted on exactly in accordance with what
the parties have agreed, is one that the parties have intended on agreeing. This is what was
62 The Will Theory, according to Van der Merwe et al supra, was predominantly developed as part of Roman-Dutch
law.
63 Van der Merwe et al ibid. at 60.
64 Van der Merwe et al, Contract General Principles, 2003: 9.4.4.














envisaged by Watermeyer JA in Randles: to determine whether the parties to a contract have
acted in accordance with the essentialia of the contract which they have wanted to create.
Studying simulation from a contract law perspective better allows one to appreciate why
Watermeyer JA endorsed multi-party involvement as a requirement for simulation: a contract
simply cannot be created by one person acting on their own. The consensus of two or more
parties (i.e. all the parties to the agreement) is required. And as the existence of some contract
as a vehicle for a simulation is essential for that simulated transaction to be created, the same
requirement for multi-party involvement is true for simulations.
Presumably however, where one opts to apply the ‘purpose’ requirement for simulation (vis-à-
vis that of intention), multi-party involvement as a prerequisite for simulation falls away as
‘purpose’ is not a necessary element for a contract to come into being, as is the case with the
necessity for ‘intention’. It can be conceived quite easily that a party can enter into a contract,
fully intending to honour the maxim pacta servanda sunt, but with a motive or purpose to
perform some act in contravention of a statute, this purpose further being entirely absent from
the co-contractor.66
3.2.2.2Purpose
As Lewis JA interprets the common law and De Wet CJ’s minority judgment in Randles (which
NWK seems to approve of), the question is not what the intention of the parties were when
entering into the contract, but rather what the purpose of the contract was – what did any one
of the parties to the contract seek to achieve?67
As opposed to ‘intention’, ‘purpose’ or ‘motive’ speaks to the reason for entering into the
transaction. E.g. if the parti s intended to enter into a contract of sale, why was it that they
wanted to do so? What was the purpose/motive for the contract of sale?
A simple example to illustrate the ‘purpose’ requirement can be as follows:
A customer purchases a diamond ring from a local jeweller. However, unknown to the
customer, the item purchased from the jeweller has been smuggled illegally into the country by
the jeweller. The customer fully intends to pay for the purchase of the ring from the jeweller,
who in turn also intends to honour the agreement by handing over the ring to the customer.
Clearly, both parties intend to give effect to the contract of sale in accordance with its tenor.
66 For an example of the ‘multi-party’ requirement being absent from the test for ‘purpose’, refer to the example
below in Chapter 3.2.2.2.
67 In this regard it is significant to note that in the judgment, nowhere does the court conclude on FNB’s purpose
(although admittedly it would presumably have been easy for the court to conclude that its purpose with the
transaction was to obtain a tax benefit for NWK). This should be distinguished from the test in Erf 3183/1
Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd and another v CIR where the court at 243 did make a determination as to the involvement of
both parties to the agreement. It is accordingly understood that, whilst there can only be one intention between
parties to a contract, the purpose or motive for entering into that contract may differ. When this principle is
applied to simulations, the effect is that for a simulated intention to be present, this is required for both contracting














However, the purpose with which both parties entered into the contract would differ: the
customer’s purpose was to buy the jewellery for legitimate purposes. The smuggling jeweller’s
purpose was to make a profit and rid himself of the illegal contraband in his possession.
Note that the above example is not one to illustrate ‘simulation’, but merely of how ‘purpose’
differs from ‘intention’. Clearly, it would be incorrect to allege that a simulation has occurred as
the necessary requirements of ‘substance over form’ and ‘in fraudem legis’ have not been
breached.
Once ascertained however that the purpose of any one contracting party for entering into the
contract is to be determined, the question that still begs answering remains: how is this to be
determined? To this, Lewis JA provides the answer in NWK at 55:
‘The test ... require(s) an examination of the commercial sense of the transaction: of its
real substance and purpose.’
The commercial rationale of a transaction would seem, from the NWK-judgment, to be the
overriding factor to determine whether simulation is present between parties. This is not to
imply that this would always be the test for simulation, or even the overriding factor in applying
the test. It is submitted that, as every case should be evaluated on a case by case basis, so the
overriding factor would need to be determined for each individual case. However, one would
probably find that, as tax is a commercial matter, that the commercial reason for a transaction
would inevitably always be a primary indicator in tax cases where simulation is involved.68
The phrase ‘commercial reason/sense/substance/purpose’ is used interchangeably a total of 9
times by Lewis JA in her judgment.69 And used in the context which it was in the extract quoted
above, the inference seems to be made that the commercial reason for the transaction would
expose the real substance and purpose of the transaction (i.e. other than the one portrayed).
At first glance, one is struck by the apparent contradiction of ‘real substance and purpose’ and
how this would differ from the ‘substance and purpose’. However, the only logical explanation
to be made is that the court refers to the ‘real substance and purpose’ of the transaction as
opposed to the substance and purpose portrayed and presented to the court by NWK (and FNB
and Slab). It is therefore significant that the court looks beyond the ipse dixit of the parties or
the wording of the contract to arrive at a conclusion of the real substance and purpose of the
transactions.70 In this regard, the judgment in Ladysmith (as approved in NWK) also noted that
‘the mere production of agreements does not prove that the parties genuinely intended them to
have the effect they appear to have’.71 The wording of a contract can therefore not be used as
prima facie proof of the subjective purpose of the parties at conclusion of a contract, although it
68 The most recent Supreme Court of Appeal case on simulation, Conhage, is an example of this.
69 Refer to Chapter 4.1 below for a discussion on whether the phrase ‘commercial substance’ as used by the court
in NWK has any connotation to the defined term in GAAR.
70 Malan v KBI [1983] 45 SATC 59.














is conceded that this would be one of the factors which a court would need to take into account
in determining the purpose of a contracting party.
Plainly speaking, it is evident from the judgment that the judge sought to determine what NWK
stood to gain from the transactions commercially. And from the judgment it is clear– in lending
some R46 million in excess of the R50 million for which it initially applied to FNB, nothing other
than a tax benefit was to gain. The purpose therefore was to (solely or mainly) obtain a tax
benefit through disguised means and, as a result, the interest on the additional R46 million lent
for these purposes alone was disallowed as an income tax deduction.
3.2.3 Subjective v Objective: determining ‘purpose’
Under the heading ‘A genuine intention to borrow R96,415,776? The peculiar features of the
transactions’, Lewis JA continues to set out the ‘several inexplicable aspects to the whole series
of transactions’ which she further considered. They were:
 On the same day that the loan agreement of R96,415,776 was signed, NWK also
accepted a short-term loan of R50,000,000 from FNB. The court drew the inference
that the R50,000,000 was what was actually required, with the first-mentioned loan
required for other purposes;
 The loan was not to be repaid by money, but rather through delivery of a commodity;
 FNB received and paid substantially the same amount on the same day for the
respective right to receive and obligation to deliver the same quantity of maize i.e.
109,315 tons;72
 NWK’s own witness conceded that it was impossible to ascertain or accurately estimate
what the price of maize is expected to be in 5 years;
 The description of the quality of the maize to be delivered by NWK in 2003 were vague;
 No security was required of NWK for delivery of the maize, an indication that both NWK
and the FNB Group were aware that the different delivery obligations relating to the
maize would effectively disappear through confusio; and
 Slab’s role in granting the loan when both NWK and FNB knew that all rights and
obligations would be ceded to FNB.














Other considerations mentioned by Lewis JA in her judgment elsewhere include:
 The respective obligations by NWK and FNB to deliver the same quantity of maize to
each other were dependent on each other. ‘If one did not perform the other could
not.’73+74
 Originally an overdraft of only R50 million was required; and
 The various contracts at issue were linked (which is reminiscent of Ladysmith)75.
In law, to carry out either a subjective or an objective test, a court only has objective indicators
which it can apply at its disposal. This, although perhaps undesirable, is understandable, as to
apply a subjective test, a court is unable ex post facto to look into the mind of a person – it can
only do so through looking at the facts brought before it to determine what the intention was at
the time in question.
This principle, which is one of established law, was explained as follows by Miller J (as he then
was) in ITC 118576 at 123 to 124:
‘It is no difficult matter to say that an important factor is: what was the taxpayer’s
intention when he bought the property? It is often very difficult, however, to discover
what his true intention was. It is necessary to bear in mind in that regard that the ipse
dixit of the taxpayer as to his intent and purpose should not lightly be regarded as
decisive. It is the function of the court to determine on an objective review of all the
relevant facts and circumstances what the motive, purpose and intention of the taxpayer
were. Not the least important of the facts will be the course of conduct of the taxpayer in
relation to the transactions in issue, the nature of his business or occupation and the
frequency or otherwise of his past involvement or participation in similar transactions. The
facts in regard to those matters will form an important part of the material from which the
court will draw its own inferences against the background of the general human and
business probabilities. This is not to say that the court will give little or no weight to what
the taxpayer says his intention was, as is sometimes contended in argument on behalf of
the Secretary in cases of this nature. The taxpayer’s evidence under oath and that of his
witnesses must necessarily be given full consideration and the credibility of the witnesses
73 At 29.
74 Although not specifically mentioned, this reminds one of Hefer, JA’s judgment in Ladysmith at 242, ‘These
anomalies are consistent with a wider, unexpressed agreement or tacit understanding the terms of which have not
been divulged. As such they bear significantly on the question whether the accrual to the [taxpayers] of a right to
the erection of the buildings has been concealed. Of course, as [the taxpayers’] attorney stressed, the documents
clearly distinguish between the Fund’s rights and obligations vis-à-vis the [taxpayers] (deriving from the main
leases) and its rights and obligations vis-à-vis Pioneer [the] (deriving from the sub-leases). But this in fact confirms
the impression of a deliberate attempt to give to each agreement a semblance of self-sufficiency which it did not
have.’ and earlier at 241, ‘But the fact remains that it was obvious to all concerned that this was no ordinary
transaction.’ It was also this delivery and counter-delivery of the same maize which caused Lewis JA to now
famously remark (at 21), ‘What a charade.’
75 At 29.














must be assessed as in any other case which comes before the court. But direct evidence
of intent and purpose must be weighed and tested against the probabilities and the
inferences normally to be drawn from the established facts.’77 (own emphasis)
This is of course true for tax law as much as it is for other branches of law. Unfortunately, in
order to apply the subjective test to determine what the actual intentions of the contracting
parties were, as opposed to those portrayed by the wording of the contract between them inter
partes, a court would have to make use of objective indicators. These would be inter alia the
ipse dixit of the parties, the wording used in the contract itself, their actions leading up to and
after conclusion of the contract, etc.
It is therefore submitted that Lewis JA, in using the above indicators in determining the
‘commercial reason’ for the transactions, did not necessarily apply these to determine the
purpose of the transactions objectively. Quite the opposite: the court was applying its new test
developed to determine the purpose of NWK subjectively, but with the use of objective
indicators it was able, if not compelled, to do. And with the ipse dixit of NWK being of limited
value,78 the primary objective indicator available would be the commercial purpose of the
transactions under consideration.
In questioning whether the transactions in NWK actually even amounted to simulation in the
first place, Emslie commented as follows:79
‘We agree that, in testing whether a transaction is a simulated transaction, a court can
examine the “commercial sense of the transaction” and “its real substance and purpose”,
but this should be done through the eyes of the parties to the transaction. The test for
simulation is necessarily a subjective one, for the question whether parties have an
intention to deceive can only be subjective. However, Lewis JA appears to have opted for
an objective test.’
It would be foolish to disagree with the assertion made in the first sentence of the above
extract. It is submitted that, as is alluded to by Emslie, that the test for simulation is
necessarily a subjective one. However, as Emslie would probably agree, the (primary) purpose
to obtain a tax benefit, as envisaged in NWK, will also be necessarily a factor which needs to be
determined subjectively.80 Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that Lewis JA, after at length
discussing that the test for simulation should be based upon the purpose of a contracting party,
continued to apply this purpose test, and to apply it subjectively at that as proposed by Miller
77 Subsequently approved in Malan v KBI [1983] 45 SATC 59.
78 Refer 70 supra.
79 Emslie, T SC, Simulated Transactions – NWK revised, The Taxpayer, Vol. 60 No. 2.















J81 the case should be. Had this not been the case, and had Lewis JA indeed promoted one test
at length in obiter but applied another in ratio, the reader would again be afforded the
opportunity to exclaim: ‘What a charade’.82
3.3 The test for simulation
It has been often suggested that the ‘new test’ in NWK has been set out as part of obiter
comments by the court.83 The reasoning is that the ‘new test’ is based on the determination of
objective factors, whereas the ‘old test’ of Watermeyer JA in Randles was clearly applied by
determining the subjective intention of the parties to a contract. Therefore, the argument goes,
as the ratio of NWK was reached by applying a subjective test, therefore the majority decision
in Randles was the one actually applied. As justification for this, the following extracts of the
NWK judgment are quoted:
At 75:
‘Barnard understood the consequences of the cession: effectively NWK’s obligation to
deliver the maize was cancelled. The debts were reciprocally discharged by confusio – the
concurrence of the right and the obligation in the same person – FNB. (sic)’
At 88:
‘There was no evidence that Barnard was deceived by FNB. He knew how the contracts,
even those to which NWK was not a party, were to be structured and that the deliveries in
respect of maize were simulated.’
It is conceded that it is quite clear that a subjective approach has been followed by Lewis JA.
However, this does not necessarily indicate a divergence from the approach to determine the
purpose with which the transactions were entered into. It is accordingly submitted that the
application of the subjective test is not proof that the court in NWK actually applied Watermeyer
JA’s test. As discussed above, both Watermeyer JA’s, as well as Lewis JA’s tests are subjective.
However, one would be justified to claim that the court in NWK did apply the ‘intention test’
from Randles, as is evident from the following dictum:
81 ITC1185 supra.
82 NWK at 21.















‘(NWK) did not intend, genuinely, to borrow a sum approximating the one it purported to
borrow.’
And at 89:
‘These aspects all lead to the conclusion that the agreements in respect of maize were
illusory: there was never any intention to deliver maize in the future. The loan was a
simulated transaction, designed to create a tax benefit for NWK.’
However, it would simply be inaccurate to intimate that the ‘purpose test’ was not also applied:
At 85:
‘The balance was added on for a purpose that Barnard could not explain, other than as a
hedge.’
At 86:
‘As I have said, the appropriate question to be asked, in order to determine whether the
loan and other transactions were simulated, is whether there was a real and sensible
commercial purpose in the transaction other than the opportunity to claim deductions of
interest from income tax on a capital amount greater than R50m.’
At 87:
‘The contract was dressed up in order to create an obligation to pay interest, and
consequently a right to claim a tax deduction, to which NWK was not entitled.’
And finally at 90:
‘...the conclusion that I have reached (is) that the loan for R96 415 776 was a transaction














As such, the subjective test applied by Lewis JA, as is evident from the above extracts, is that
the test applied is not the crisp test of Randles. But, it is again conceded, based on the above
extracts, nor is it the test conceived by Lewis JA in 42 to 55 of NWK. Rather, the test actually
applied seems to be a mixture of the ‘purpose’ and ‘intention’ tests.
The conclusion is therefore reached that the ‘new test’ is not obiter, but part of the ratio of the
judgment as this was applied exactly in reaching the decision of the full bench of the court.
However, the test formulated is not a purely purposive approach. The opinion has been voiced
that NWK has muddied the distinction between purpose and intention in determining whether
simulation was present.84 It is submitted that such a reading of the judgment is incorrect.
Rather, an honest reading of NWK points to the fact the ‘purpose’ approach has been added on
to the existing test of Watermeyer JA’s as an extension or additional arm. This approach and
intention of the court inferred from the judgment is substantiated by the following remark in
NWK at 55:
‘In my view the test to determine simulation cannot simply be whether there is an
intention to give effect to a contract in accordance with its terms... The test should thus
go further...’
And again at 80:
‘But as I have said, there must be some substance – commercial reason – in the
arrangement, not just an intention to achieve a tax benefit or to avoid the application of
a law.’ (own emphasis)
This supports the notion that Watermeyer JA’s ‘intention test’ still stands, but with an added
element of purpose. Another element which has been added to the doctrine (which seems to
have been ignored by Vorster, Emslie and Broomberg) is that multi-party involvement is no
longer required by the NWK-test. Indeed, it will be noted from the judgment that nowhere is a
determination made as to either the purpose or intention of FNB.85 Had the Randles test of
Watermeyer JA been applied in its true sense, then a ruling as to FNB’s intention would have
also been required. As this is absent, this adds further proof that a varied test from that in
Randles was applied in NWK.
84 Williams, RC, Simulated transactions – moving the goalposts, PwC South Africa Synopsis Tax Today, January
2011.














Therefore, the test for simulation, as set down in NWK, would have received additional
requirements (with 3.2 below ‘going further’ than previously envisaged in Randles). Finally, it
would be more appropriate to phrase the test in the negative, i.e.:
For a simulation principle to be present:
1. The substance of the transaction must be different from the form in which it is
presented; and
2. The substance must have the effect to avoid tax (or another peremptory of law).
3. If both criteria 1 and 2 above are present, the simulation doctrine will apply if
either:
3.1 A subjective intention is present:
3.1.1 To have presented the transaction in the disguised form; and
3.1.2 In both contracting parties; or
3.2 The subjective86 purpose of any one of the parties is to achieve a goal
different to the one portrayed, i.e. a tax benefit.
Simulation is therefore present if, either the parties intended to conceal the true nature of any
contract, or if any party to a contract concealed that its purpose/motive to enter into the
contract was to obtain some tax advantage.87
NWK has, admittedly, not expressly spelled out whether, for a simulation to be present, both
the ‘purpose’ and ‘intention’ tests need to be considered, or whether it would be sufficient for
either the tainted ‘purpose’ or ‘intention’ to be present. However, from the context of the
judgment itself, even though both tests are applied, it is conceivable that the court would have
found simulation to be present had only either a prohibited intention or purpose been present.
It follows, however, that NWK, although it failed both, would have been on the losing end had it
failed only either the ‘intention’ or ‘purpose’ tests. This is further supported by Lewis JA’s
remarks quoted above at 55 and 80 that the test of Watermeyer JA ‘should go further’ and
should not be limited to determining ‘just an intention’. The transpiring effect is therefore that
the principle of simulation should not be limited by creating another requirement for it, but
86 Refer Chapter 3.2.2.
87 It should be noted that this test will lead to the absurdity that, if a party conceals its purpose for entering into a
contract to obtain a tax benefit, then simulation will apply. However, if the purpose of the transaction is not
concealed, it will not fall within the scope of the simulation doctrine, and it may still be safe from the application of














rather to enable it to be applied to a wider range of transactions, i.e. creating a new basis upon
which simulation can be established.
It could be argued that the ‘purpose’ test should be reserved for application by GAAR and not
the common law. Again, it is not the purpose of this paper to take a view on the accuracy of
NWK. What is however evident from the above discussion is that the test for simulation has
been extended and that it has as a result become an increasingly more powerful weapon in
SARS’ ever-growing weaponry.
The fact of the matter is that the simulation doctrine now has wider application.88 In brief,
previously one only had to prove that the intention of the parties involved in an agreement was
genuine. Now, the taxpayer must in addition also show that the purpose of the transaction was
not to obtain some tax benefit through presenting a legal form which in substance the
transaction is not.
To illustrate, it is perhaps best to use the facts in Randles. Both parties to the contract intended
to enter into contracts of sale. Thus, requirement 3.1 above is met. However, Randles
simulated the purpose with which it entered into the contracts – it pretended to have done so
with the purpose of merely transacting in textiles, where in actual fact the purpose was to
obtain a tax benefit. As such, according to NWK’s test, a simulation would have been present.
88 A view supported by Silke. See Silke, J. From NKR to NWK, Tax Planning Corporate and Personal, Volume 25 No.















THE PRESENT – INTERNATIONAL APPROACH
An interrogation into the international approach to simulated transactions proves to be as
vibrant and current as is the case in South Africa. In fact, this is even truer in those
jurisdictions that rely solely on common law to combat tax avoidance in the absence of
legislated general anti-avoidance legislation, such as e.g. the United Kingdom (‘UK’).
The three jurisdictions decided on for the comparative legal study are the UK, Australia and
Canada. The latter two were both at one time British colonies (like South Africa) and therefore
share the same underlying legal basis from which the simulation doctrine was developed.
By conducting this comparison, it is important to note the reliance that the various countries
place on the simulation doctrine to enforce tax legislation. Of further import is what the
contents of these principles currently entail compared to the South African position discussed in
Chapters 2 and 3 supra. Specifically in this regard, the focus of the commentary is on whether
the test is exclusively one of purpose, intention or a combination of these.
Even though the comparison is made only with regards to the three jurisdictions mentioned, it is
important to note that the existence of the simulation doctrine is not limited to these. Rather, it
also finds support from the OECD, indicating that it enjoys recognition and application even
beyond the boundries of the historic common law systems:89
‘A tax administration’s examination of a controlled transaction ordinarily should be
based on the transaction actually undertaken by the associated enterprises as it has
been structured by them, using the methods applied by the taxpayer... However, there
are ... particular circumstances in which it may, exceptionally, be both appropriate and
legitimate for a tax administration to consider disregarding the structure adopted by a
taxpayer in entering into a controlled transaction. (W)here the economic substance of a
transaction differs from its form ... the tax administration may disregard the parties’
characterisation of the transaction and re-characterise it in accordance with its
substance.’ (own emphasis)
4.1 The United Kingdom
4.1.1 A judicial GAAR
For long, UK courts have adopted, through a literal interpretation of fiscal statutes, a
conservative approach to tax avoidance. If upon a literal reading of statute a person could not














be brought within the taxing provisions of the relevant act, no tax was levied. This is perhaps
best explained in the dictum by Lord Cairns in Partington v Attorney General:90
‘If a person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed,
however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand,
if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the
law, the subject is free, however apparently within the law the case might otherwise
appear to be. In other words, if there be an equitable construction, certainly such a
construction is not admissible in a taxing statute, where you can simply adhere to the
words of the statute.’
Although the UK courts may not have been closed to the notion of a purposive interpretation of
statutes; where fiscal statutes in particular were however concerned, these Acts were protected
from the application of a purposive interpretation to those statutes, as is evident from the above
extract.
IRC v Duke of Westminister for long formed the basis of UK courts’ approach to tax avoidance,
and specifically the dictum of Lord Tomlin at 19 quoted in Chapter 1.1 supra. This judgment
displays not only the courts’ insistence of a literal approach to statutes taxing, but also to its
animosity towards using the common law as a means to circumvent a literal interpretation of
the Legislature’s intention in enacting the provision concerned. In this regard, following on Lord
Tomlin’s dictum at 19, he continues to display his disaffection as follows:
‘This so-called doctrine of “the substance” seems to me to be nothing more than an
attempt to make a man pay notwithstanding that he has so ordered his affairs that the
amount of tax sought from him is not legally claimable.’
However, this position has since been substituted for a purposive approach, particularly by the
landmark decision in Ramsay:91
‘What are “clear words” is to be ascertained upon normal principles: these do not
confine the courts to literal interpretation. There may, indeed should, be considered the
context and scheme of the relevant Act as a whole, and its purpose may, indeed should,
be regarded.’
This approach, which is still followed currently in the UK as ruling precedent, ‘liberated the
construction of revenue statutes from being both literal and blinkered’,92 and enabled the UK
90 [1869] LR 4 HL 100.














courts to keep in pace with more ingenious tax avoidance schemes not addressed by fiscal
legislation.93 Prebble & Prebble supports this notion, and continues to state that under a
purposive approach, courts would ‘determine whether the legal form of a transaction matches
its economic substance’.94 This approach was approved and established in Barclays Mercantile
Business Finance Limited v Mawson (Inspector of Tax)95 at 32:
‘The essence of the new approach was to give the statutory provision a purposive
construction in order to determine the nature of the transaction to which it was intended
to apply and then to decide whether the actual transaction (which might involve
considering the overall effect of a number of elements intended to operate together)
answered to the statutory description. Of course this does not mean that the courts
have to put their reasoning into the straitjacket of first construing the statute in the
abstract and then looking at the facts. It might be more convenient to analyse the facts
and then ask whether they satisfy the requirements of the statute. But however one
approaches the matter, the question is always whether the relevant provision of statute,
upon its true construction, applies to the facts as found.’
As commented in note 93 supra, a purposive approach is less restricting upon courts in
interpreting statutes, and would indeed be a more effective mechanism to combat tax
avoidance, especially in a jurisdiction where no general anti-avoidance provisions have been
enacted. This may however prove to be an unwieldy weapon, especially when specific anti-
avoidance provisions are introduced in future, as is currently being considered by the UK
Legislature.96
4.1.2 A legislated GAAR
It remains to be answered whether taxpayers will have to be weary of both the courts’ wide
discretion in combating tax avoidance through the common law under the reigning purposive
approach to fiscal legislation as well as under the terms of general anti-avoidance provisions so
legislated. Although new legislation may merely supplant what the UK courts would also deem
to be avoidance transactions, the risk exists that the UK courts may through the common law
92 Barclays Mercantile Business Finance Limited v Mawson (Inspector of Tax) [2004] UKHL 51.
93 It is natural that courts should prefer a purposive approach, as this allows for wider discretion. However, it is
submitted that where such an approach is exercised without caution or restraint, this would go against the very
rule of law: it is not the courts’ role in a democratic society to keep up with the ingenuity of taxpayers, but that of
the Legislature. This is not to say that a purposive approach to fiscal legislation is an evil, but rather that the
motive for exercising discretion in applying a purposive approach to fiscal legislation should not be because a court
feels obliged to fulfil the role of the Legislating body.
94 Prebble, Z., Prebble, J. Comparing the General Anti-Avoidance Rule of Income Tax Law with the Civil Law
Doctrine of Abuse of Law, Bulletin for International Taxation, April 2008.
95 [2004] UKHL 51.














have provided themselves with powers reaching even beyond legislation – a risk which has been
identified in South Africa following NWK.97
With this as background, it is probably unsurprising that the Study Group98 assembled to advise
the UK Government on the advisability of introducing a GAAR to the UK fiscal statutes, advised
against such a ‘broad spectrum’ rule being legislated. However, it proposed the following as
alternative:99
‘I have concluded that introducing a broad spectrum general anti-avoidance rule would
not be beneficial for the UK tax system. This would carry a real risk of undermining the
ability of business and individuals to carry out sensible and responsible tax planning.
Such tax planning is an entirely appropriate response to the complexities of a tax
system such as the UK’s...
However, introducing a moderate rule which does not apply to responsible tax planning,
and is instead targeted at abusive arrangements, would be beneficial for the UK tax
system.’ (own emphasis)
Therefore, some form of a GAAR is accordingly proposed, although some care is taken to
distinguish this as an ‘anti-abuse rule’ as opposed to a broad spectrum general anti-avoidance
rule, as is envisaged in the extract above.100 One might sceptically wonder what the difference
would be between a GAAR and the preferred so-called anti-abuse rule, and whether this may in
fact be nothing more than a euphemism to appease those opposed to a legislated GAAR.101 This
scepticism is not appeased by the possibility mentioned by Adv. Aaronson to have the anti-
abuse rule applied retrospectively.102 Of further note in this regard is the risk pointed out by
Lethaby that the proposed anti-abuse rule may go beyond catching the so-called ‘Category 1’
arrangements (i.e. arrangements with the sole purpose of reducing a tax liability) and also
ensnare ‘Category 2 and 3’ arrangements (respectively arrangements with the main purpose to
obtain a tax benefit, but which also has a commercial purpose and arrangements with an
97 Refer Broomberg’s comments on the rule of law and the doctrine of separation of powers at ibid. 34 at 16.
98 The Study Group was lead and assembled by Aaronson, G. QC, who was commissioned to do so by the
Exchequer Secretary. http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/news/news-211111.htm.
99 The GAAR Study Group lead by Aaronson, G. QC. GAAR Study – A study to consider whether a general anti-
avoidance rule should be introduced into the UK tax system. 11 November 2011. At 1.5 to 1.7.
100 It is interesting to note that one of the reasons offered in support of a GAAR by the Study Group at 3.13 is to
prevent the need by courts to ‘stretch’ the interpretation of statutes through a purposive interpretation thereof.
Compare to the comments made in note 82 supra.
101 From the correspondence with the tax directors of the Norton Rose Group noted at 96 supra, it is curious to
note that the four essentialia (to borrow from the law of contract) of the South African (SA) GAAR are all
conspicuously present, albeit accompanied by various ‘safeguards’ (some more subtle than others), viz. the
presence of an arrangement, abnormality, a tax benefit and the sole or main purpose to achieve said benefit.
Since the scope of this paper is not to compare the proposed UK GAAR with the virgin SA GAAR, further comments
regarding the contents of the proposed UK GAAR will be limited. However, as to the SA GAAR, the influence
thereof and possible overlapping with the simulation doctrine as part of the SA common law will be discussed in
more detail in Chapter 5.2.














overriding commercial purpose but which also incorporates an element designed to neutralise
certain tax effects).103
Be that as it may, without a GAAR or anti-abuse rule, the three anti-avoidance mechanisms
currently available to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (‘HMRC’) are:104
1 A purposive interpretation of tax statutes;
2 Specific anti-avoidance legislation to target specifically identified areas of vulnerability in
fiscal legislation; and
3 So-called DOTAS (Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Schemes).105
A quick glance at the above list is sufficient to conclude that, compared to the South African
position, the UK anti-avoidance arsenal is lacking only in the existence of a legislated GAAR. As
for the rest, the weaponry is mostly identical. The question of course is whether a GAAR is a
necessity for an effective combating of tax avoidance schemes, and whether a judicial GAAR
would not suffice without having to also enact a legislative GAAR.
4.1.3 A solution to HMRC’s (and other revenue collectors’) woes?
One of the greatest flaws of a purely judicial GAAR, it is argued by Freedman,106 is the
uncertainty linked thereto:107
‘Judges inevitably are faced with the temptation to stretch the interpretation, so far as
possible, to achieve a sensible result; and this is widely regarded as producing
considerable uncertainty in predicting the outcome of such disputes.’
In line with this sentiment, Aaronson states at 4.22 of the GAAR Study Group report:
‘A number of representative bodies expressed the hope that, given the protection
against unacceptable tax schemes which the GAAR would provide, the Courts should not
seek to extend the application of the Ramsay principle beyond the stage already
reached in the decided cases. This was, again, in order to reduce the uncertainty
affecting the centre ground of tax planning.’
103 Lethaby, H, Aaronson’s GAAR, British Tax Review, 2012, Number 1.
104 Ibid. at 96.
105 Which is not unlike the South African version of Reportable Arrangements as contained in sections 80M to 80T.
106 Freedman, J, GAAR as a process and the process of discussing the GAAR, British Tax Review, 2012, Number 1.
107 HMRC & HMT, Simplifying Unallowable Purpose Tests Discussion Document and Summary of Responses 2009;














If nothing else, these extracts echo the sentiment that (which it is submitted is not only
applicable to UK tax practitioners) the bold, purposive interpretation of fiscal statutes lead to
uncertainty. If nothing else, it is conceded that one of the primary objectives of courts are to
provide clarity on laws which the Legislature through perhaps clumsy drafting were not able to.
At issue however is not so much the interpretation of tax statutes, but rather the uncertainty
which is created when courts are given full reign on developing the law in a way which they
deem fit. This manifests in, where statutes are concerned, a disregard for the wording used by
the Legislature to communicate its intent,108 and in the case of the common law, by candidly
disregarding the doctrine of stare decisis, or swerving past it by conveniently distinguishing
from the facts of the authoritative judgment.109
The answer is not necessarily that a GAAR should be legislated, but merely that courts should
exercise their powers of interpretation of statute with restraint, especially where fiscal statutes
are concerned.110 If these principles are not adhered to, it is with respect submitted that a
subversion of the rule of law would take place, as contemplated in footnotes 97 and 108 above.
And, returning to South African soil, this is exactly what the problem is perceived to be with
NWK as far as the common law is concerned. However, irrespective of the accuracy or
correctness of NWK,111 if one accepts that stare decisis will be observed in future, then NWK is
here to stay.
Comparing the UK position with the South African development in anti-avoidance tax law
observed in recent history, it is interesting to note that the movement in the UK is away from
primarily relying on the courts to safeguard the fiscus, towards an increasing pro-legislative
GAAR approach. This seems in fact to also be in line with international trends.112 In South
Africa however, the movement seems to be the other way round in the past 6 years for which
the South African GAAR has been on the statute books. In fact, a memo received from the
Norton Rose tax directors113 points to the fact that since the South African GAAR has been in
existence, ‘SARS has never used it’.
Perhaps the UK should take its cue from South Africa in the all the more dawning realisation
that a legislated GAAR is not necessarily a more powerful weapon (given of course that its
courts are bold enough to interpret the common law liberally, as was recently the case in South
Africa with the NWK judgment): In South Africa, tax avoidance is being combated by all means
necessary, except seemingly the GAAR.
108 In Defy Ltd v C:SARS [2010] 72 SATC 99 at 46, Nugent JA commented: ‘I have some difficulty with the idea
that a construction of the parts of a statute can produce one result but a construction of the sum of its parts can
produce another. It needs to be born in mind that a statute is not a statement of policy by the legislature that
leaves the detail to be filled in by a court. It is policy that has been translated into law. If it has not been
adequately translated I do not think that it is for courts to rewrite the statute. That would seem to me to strike at
the heart of the rule of law.’
109 Refer to Chapter 5.4 for a discussion on the stare decisis doctrine.
110 This holds specifically true for the law of tax as the virtues of rationality and equity are not always, unlike the
other branches of the law, present. In this regard the comments in Cactus Investments and Partington referred to
supra are particularly relevant.
111 Which has been repeatedly mentioned is not the aim of the paper to comment on.
112 Examples of which are discussed below in Chapters 4.2 and 4.3.














Be it as it may, it is evident that the UK is now doing more than to merely commission an
investigative study, but is in fact one step closer to enacting a GAAR. In a paper published on
21 March 2012, the UK Government in principle accepted the necessity to legislate a GAAR in
the near future:114
‘The Government accepts the recommendation of the Aaronson Report, published on 11
November 2011, that a GAAR targeted at artificial and abusive tax avoidance schemes
would improve the UK’s ability to tackle tax avoidance whilst maintaining the
attractiveness of the UK economy as a location for genuine business investment. The
Government will consult on: new draft legislation which will be based on the
recommendations of the Aaronson Report; establishment of the Advisory Panel; and the
development of full explanatory guidance... The consultation will be issued in summer
2012 with a view to introducing legislation in Finance Bill 2013. The Government is
committed to ensuring that this legislation effectively tackles abusive tax avoidance and
that the supporting guidance is practical both for taxpayers and for HMRC.’
4.2 Australia
4.2.1 Approach to tax avoidance
The Australians were quite quick in taking up the very much in vogue international position of
adopting a GAAR (as early as in 1981) to afford additional protection to the fiscus together with
other mechanisms available to combat abusive behaviour by taxpayers.115 Not only does the
Australian Taxation Office (‘ATO’) depend on these provisions regularly, but these are also set to
be revisited, and upgraded, by the Australian legislature in an attempt to make it more difficult
for ‘those taxpayers who are not doing the right thing ... (to) escape their tax obligations’.116
These amendments, which are not unexpected, follow an array of tax cases in which the ATO
were on the losing side.117
Irrespective of the fact that the Australian authorities are growing increasingly dependent on
reliance on the legislated GAAR provisions in their Income Tax Assessment Act, this is not to say
that the simulation doctrine is unknown ‘down under’. In fact, in the most recent Australian tax
case dealing with dishonest simulations, or ‘sham’ transactions, Raftland Pty Ltd as trustee of
114 HMRC & HM Treasury, Overview of Tax Legislation and Rates at 2.58, 21 March 2012, accessed on 8 May 2012
at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/budget2012/ootlar-main.pdf.
115 Income Tax Assessment Act, act no. 27 of 1936, contained in Part IVA.
116 Arbib, M. Maintaining the effectiveness of the general anti-avoidance rule. Assistant Treasurer in Australia in a
media statement by his office released on 1 March 2012.
117 Collins, Earl & Thompson, Reforms to Austrailia’s General Anti-Avoidance Rules, PwC ITS News, International














the Raftland Trust v Commissioner of Taxation,118 this was the main argument advanced by the
ATO.119
4.2.2 Australian sham
It has been held in Sharrment Pty Ltd v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy120 that the concept of
‘sham’ is defined as follows:
‘A “sham” is ... for the purposes of Australian law, something that is intended to be
mistaken for something else or that is not really what it purports to be. It is a spurious
imitation, a counterfeit, a disguise or a false front. It is not genuine or true, but
something made in imitation of something else or made to appear to be something
which it is not. It is something which is false or deceptive.’
To this, Kirby J in Raftland121 comments:
‘Important to this description is the idea that the parties do not intend to give effect to
the legal arrangements set out in their apparent agreement, understood only according
to its terms. In Australia, this has become essential to the notion of sham, which
contemplates a disparity between the ostensible and the real intentions of the parties.
The courts must therefore test the intentions of parties, as expressed in
documentation,122 against their own testimony on the subject (if any) and the available
objective evidence tending to show what that intention really was.’ (own emphasis)
From the above it is clear that the sham doctrine subscribed to in Australia is ad idem with the
pre-NWK approach followed in SA, and is as set out in the Watermeyer JA judgment in Randles
supra. What is further evident is that this purist approach is still been followed in Australia,
whereas the South African approach seems to have diverged from this route, as explained in
Chapter 3.
118 [2008] HCA 21.
119 This judgment, and in particular the minority concurring judgment is discussed in more detail below. Of
particular assistance is the judgment delivered by Kirby J wherein he sets out the various positions and
development of the simulation doctrine internationally.
120 [1988] 18 FCR 449 at 454.
121 Ibid. at 118. It should be noted by the reader as an aside that the Raftland case was heard by the High Court
of Australia, being the apex court in that country which is able to deal with tax disputes (the equivalent of South
Africa’s Supreme Court of Appeal).















However, as Kirby J explains in Raftland, the question is more and more asked of courts to
adopt a more ‘ample’ approach to embody the simulation doctrine, in order to keep in touch
with other legal developments. These factors, according to Kirby J, are:
 Both legal and public criticism of avoidance schemes mustering judicial scrutiny;
 The increasing legal shift away from strong formalistic requirements (for all guises of
law);
 A growing preference given to purposive interpretation of legislation vis-à-vis strict
literalism;
 Following on the above, an increased reliance by courts on external materials and
evidence to interpret legislation; and
 The growing realisation that fiscal legislation cannot stand in isolation, but should follow
these general legal developments.
What Kirby J is referring to is the increasing confrontation which courts are faced with to
acknowledge that simulation also (or rather) has a ‘purpose’ element as a test requirement
which must be passed. Specifically, what Kirby J points out is that this ‘purpose’ element which
courts are beckoned to acknowledge is, under the ‘ample’ approach, whether an economic
purpose is also linked to a transaction as a further requirement that should be scrutinised.123
The glaring question is of course: is i necessary for non-simulated transactions to have some
economic purpose (other than tax saving) for the doctrine to be able to sufficiently protect
against abusive taxpayer practices? As is discussed in Chapter 5.2, the submission is that
surely, where taxpayers intend to circumvent a tax prohibition, protection against this intention
is afforded to the fiscus under the simulation doctrine. Similarly, where no intention between
parties is present, that purpose to obtain a tax benefit from the transaction should be dealt with
under a legislated GAAR. Therefore, the fact that malevolence arising from either the intention
or the purpose of the parties is sine prole; i.e. there should be no need to extend the simulation
doctrine into the realms of the purpose of a transaction.
The problem, as with so many tax provisions, is not that the law, or the judiciary for that
matter, is unwilling to support the state in its quest to grow the fiscus. Rather, the legislated
provisions, be it specific or general anti-avoidance provisions, are either not drafted with the
necessary care to provide for the support which is required to prevent transactions which
purport to abuse tax legislation, or carefully drafted legislation does not adequately envisage
the cunningness of taxpayers.














The Australian courts are, for the time being, showing resiliency and continuing to adopt the
position which has been held for many years, persisting with a narrow interpretation of the
sham principle. Thereby, in common law, it is restricting the remedy available to the ATO in
terms of sham to the subjective intent of the parties alone, without the ‘purpose’ requirement
(whether in Australia this will be determined subjectively or objectively) being an alternative
option under the doctrine.124 This has been confirmed in the recent decision of Equuscorp Pty
Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd:125
‘As the expression 'real money' might suggest, the point which the respondents sought
to make in these matters appeared to be one about the economic rather than the legal
effect of the transactions in question.’
4.3 Canada
The Canadians, as the Australians, also have a legislated GAAR in Part XVI of their Income Tax
Act.126 This, similar to the South African GAAR, contain the four essentialia, viz.
 The presence of a tax benefit;
 Arising from a transaction or a series of transactions;
 The main purpose of which is not a bona fide purpose; and
 The transaction is not at arm’s length.
In addition to their GAAR, th Canadians have also accepted, and relied on the existence, of
dishonest simulations, or sham. Drawing from its British common law roots, it has accepted the
Snook127 rendition as a accurate enunciation of what the doctrine also entails in Canada.128
However, the Canadians have not been immune to the temptation of whether simulation goes
further than looking to the intentions of the parties concerned, and whether the transaction
under scrutiny also had a commercial or business purpose. In Minister of Revenue v Leon, it
was held that:129
‘If (an) agreement or transaction lacks a bona fide business purpose, it is a sham’.130
124 Raftland ibid. at 118 at 130.
125 [2004] HCA 55.
126 R.S.C., 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.)
127 Refer supra note 17.
128 Minister of National Revenue v Cameron [1974] SCR 1062.
129 [1977] 1 FC 249 at 256.














The requirement for the above ‘business purpose’ was not allowed to reach rigor mortis, and
was soon met with disapproval in Stubart Investments Ltd v The Queen,131 wherein the
‘purpose’ requirement was effectively rejected:
At 545:
‘This expression “sham transaction” comes to us from decisions in the United Kingdom,
and it has been generally taken to mean (but not without ambiguity) a transaction
conducted with an element of deceit so as to create an illusion calculated to lead the tax
collector away from the taxpayer or the true nature of the transaction; or, simple
deception whereby the taxpayer creates a facade of reality quite different from the
disguised reality.’
And at 540:
‘A transaction may be effectual and not in any sense a sham ... but may have no
business purpose other than the tax purpose.’
Irrespective of the various flirtations with the purpose test for simulation along the way,132 the
above approach in Snook adopted in Stubart has been confirmed to be the correct one again in
McClurg v Canada,133 thereby confirming the current status quo of the doctrine in Canada. The
conservative test long heralded in Randles in South Africa therefore also seems to find
application in Canada.
4.4 Conclusion
One cannot but be inclined to agree that a review of comparative law on the subject makes for
interesting reading, especially when recent developments in South Africa are borne in mind.
What is evident is that, for all of the above jurisdictions and more, courts have time and time
again confirmed their unwillingness to extend the test for simulation beyond the subjective, or
intention, of all the parties involved. All have been confronted with the seduction of including a
purpose element to the doctrine, and specifically, with a business or commercial purpose
requirement.
131 [1984] 1 SCR 536.
132 Which is alluded to by Kirby J in his minority judgment in Raftland supra as minority decisions and academic
articles.














The New Zealand case of Accent Management Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue134 bears
reference:
‘[A]rtificiality and lack of commercial point (other than tax avoidance) are not indicia of
sham. And the concepts of sham and tax avoidance are not correlatives. As well, while
there are elements of pretence (and certainly concealment) associated with [the]
transactions [here at issue], these are explicable on bases other than sham.’ (own
emphasis)
This stands in dire contrast to the latest approach taken in South Africa and is cause for alarm
to South African taxpayers, as is explained in Chapter 5.2 infra.
What is true however domestically for the simulation doctrine, seems as much the case
internationally, as was predicted in 1964 already by Bob Dylan when obviously having the
simulation doctrine in mind:
‘The times, they are a-changin’...’
However, regardless of whether the South African position diverges from the international, this
does not detract from the authority with which the NWK judgment, which set the stage for an
ample approach, is to be treated.135
134 [2007] NZCA 230 at 59.















THE FUTURE - APPLICATION
5.1 Introduction
In looking at the development of the simulation doctrine in Chapter 2, as well as how it is
currently applied, both domestically and internationally,136 the question still begs as to the
future application of the doctrine. Indeed, looking to the history of the doctrine would be
nothing more than an academic exercise if the application thereof and its future impact cannot
be ascertained.
Accordingly therefore, given recent developments domestically, the interaction between
simulations and the GAAR is investigated in this chapter, as well as what possible transactions
the doctrine is bound to effect and what the judicial gravitas of NWK will be going forward.
5.2 Interaction with the GAAR
5.2.1 The GAAR
Briefly, the GAAR determines that the Commissioner for SARS may attach other tax
consequences to any ‘impermissible tax avoidance arrangements’.137 An impermissible tax
avoidance arrangement consists of four elements, namely:138
Requirement 1 The existence of an arrangement.
Requirement 2 The existence of a tax benefit (that is, arrangement resulting in a tax
benefit).
Requirement 3 The sole or main purpose of the avoidance arrangement is to obtain a tax
benefit.
Requirement 4 The avoidance arrangement is characterised by the presence of any one or
more of four tainted elements for arrangements in the context of business
and any one or more of three tainted elements for arrangements in the
context other than business, which renders it an impermissible avoidance
arrangement. (own emphasis)
136 Chapters 3 and 4 respectively refers.
137 Section 80A.














The above four requirements were all present in the GAAR’s predecessor in the now repealed
section 103(1), and are all sine qua non for the application of the GAAR – in the absence of any
one of these, the taxpayer will be safe.
The four tainted elements referred to as part of Requirement 4 (formerly the requirement for
the presence of abnormality) are regarding arrangements of which the following would be
true:139
Test 1 Entered into or carried out by an abnormal means or manner, not used for a
bona fide business purpose (the business abnormality test) other than
obtaining a tax benefit
Test 2 Lack of commercial substance; which consists of objective indicative tests and
an objective general or ―presumptive test (own emphasis)
Test 3 Creation of non-arm‘s length rights or obligations
Test 4 Abuse or misuse of the provisions of the Income Tax Act
Flowing from the provisions of section 82, there is little contestation that the onus for proving
the absence of any of the first-mentioned three requirements, viz. the existence of an
arrangement, the sole or main purpose and a tax benefit, is upon the taxpayer.
However, as far as the requirement for abnormality is concerned, under section 103(1), the
view expressed in Conhage, and followed in ITC 1699,140 was that the onus for proving this
requirement rested on SARS. However, where that abnormality now arises in terms of the new
GAAR as a result of a ‘lack of commercial substance’,141 both SARS142 and Broomberg143 seem
to be ad idem that this position is now different.
Regarding the onus of proof, there seems to be little respite for the taxpayer when challenged
instead in terms of simulation, as opposed to GAAR. This is because the application of section
82 is of as much application to remedies of SARS in terms of the Act as it is in common law, as
ultimately simulated transactions affect the working of the provisions of the Act. This position
was confirmed in NWK144 at 38 and 39:
‘In terms of s 82(b) of the Act NWK bore the onus of proving that the transactions were
not simulated... The mere production of the agreements was not enough to discharge
139 Ibid. at 138.
140 [1999] 63 SATC 175.
141 Refer Test 2 below.
142 Refer SARS’ draft guide supra at 138 at 9.8 and 6.1. De Koker, A.P., Silke on South African Income Tax, 2010:
19.40.
143 Broomberg, E. Then and now – V: The commercial substance test, Tax Planning, 2008, Vol. 22.
144 Which applied the position taken in Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd and another v CIR. Hefer JA held:
‘Therefore, unless the appellants have shown on a preponderance of probability that the agreements do indeed














the onus. NWK had to refute the assessment that it had a dishonest intention to
disguise a transaction.’
Dependent on the circumstances, it is submitted that any matter which may potentially involve
a simulation in a matter between SARS and a taxpayer would invariably fall within the scope of
the provisions of section 82, thus placing the onus of proof on the taxpayer to show to a court
that no simulation is present.
5.2.2 Interaction between GAAR and the simulation doctrine
It is curious to note that the court in NWK chose to use the specific phrase ‘commercial
substance’ in testing for the presence of a simulation; a term which seems to have been
borrowed from its legislated brother, the GAAR. In this regard, one would be forgiven to read
the NWK judgment for the first time and to later confusingly page back to the front: “Was the
court not supposed to first address the primary grounds for appeal, namely that a simulation
occurred first? Then why is the judgment dealing with ‘commercial substance’?”
After embarking on an extensive search, no South African cases (dealing with tax or, for what
it’s worth, any other matter) could be found where any court had previously used this phrase.
If the court intentionally borrowed the phrase from the GAAR, one would not even want to
hazard the guess that the court sought to align the simulation doctrine with the GAAR. As a
matter of law, other than for the fact that both are mechanisms through which the fiscus is
protected, in the purist’s view, these two remedies available to SARS share very little other
similarities, and correctly so.
Section 80C defines commercial substance to be present in an arrangement:
‘... if it would result in a significant tax benefit for a party ... but does not have a
significant effect upon either the business risks or net cash flows of that party apart
from any effect attributable to the tax benefit that would be obtained...’
It is submitted though that the commercial substance being referred to in NWK is not as is
defined in section 80C. In fact, nowhere in the judgment where it deals with the simulation
doctrine is reference made to the definition of the term in section 80C. Further, at the time
when the facts on NWK took place, section 80C was not yet in effect. It is submitted therefore
that not too much should be read into the court’s choice of words when seeking to draw a line
between the judgment and the GAAR. Nonetheless, the terms ‘commercial reason’, ‘commercial
substance’, ‘commercial sense’ and ‘real purpose’, as used interchangeably throughout the














purpose of the transaction was mainly to avoid tax, was this reason subordinate to another
commercial (or economic or business) goal?
Therefore, although the section 80C defined meaning of ‘commercial substance’ was not
necessarily applied in NWK, it is submitted nonetheless that the ordinary meaning of it was.
5.2.3 Picking one’s poison
A comparison between the requirements of simulation and the GAAR makes for interesting
reading. Bearing in mind that the onus for the below would always fall on the taxpayer,145 the
taxpayer has to prove any of the below in order to escape respectively the application of the
GAAR or the simulation doctrine:
Taxpayer's defences under GAAR146 Taxpayer's defences under simulation147
Absence of an arrangement
The substance and form of the transaction
correlates to its form
Absence of a tax benefit The simulation did not have the effect of
avoiding tax
Tax benefit was not the sole or main purpose
of the arrangement The intention of either party was not to
disguise the transaction AND the main
purpose was not to avoid tax (i.e. that the
transaction inter alia had commercial
substance).
In the context of business:
 Entered into or carried out by
abnormal means or manner, not used
for a bona fide business purpose;
 Lack of commercial substance;
 Creation of non-arm‘s length rights or
obligations; AND
 Abuse or misuse of the provisions of
the Act.
145 Refer Chapter 5.2.1.
146 Section 80A to 80L.














If one were to assume that it should mostly be common cause between the taxpayer and SARS
that an arrangement and a tax benefit were to be present, the taxpayer would under simulation
be limited to two possible defences, i.e.:
 that the substance of the transaction matches the form; or
 that it was neither the purpose of the transaction NOR the intention of the parties, to
conceal the transaction to obtain a tax benefit.
In comparison, the possible defences in terms of GAAR are:
 the tax benefit was not the sole or main purpose of the arrangement; or
 the arrangement was normal, i.e.:
o it was entered into by normal means for bona fide business purposes;
o it had commercial substance;
o the arrangement was entered into at arm’s length; and
o it did not result in the abuse or misuse of the provisions of the Act.
Although it may seem from the above that the hurdles for disproving a simulation are less, they
may be higher than the obstacles presented to the taxpayer in terms of GAAR.
Boiled down, the GAAR requires the taxpayer to prove, in essence, that the taxpayer’s purpose
was not to avoid tax, or that the transaction was normal. However, under simulation, the
taxpayer is required to prove either that the substance of the transaction matches its form, in
that the parties honestly intended to give effect to the contracts according to their tenor and
that the transactions were both normal and not entered into with the concealed purpose of
obtaining some tax advantage.
From the above analysis, it seems certain that, where available, SARS may view the remedy in
terms of the simulation doctrine (where the facts allow for its application) stronger than the
protection afforded in terms of GAAR.
It is predicted that, with the latest development of the simulation doctrine, a flurry of activity
will be seen surrounding the simulation doctrine. Indeed, the submission is that post-NWK, this














Two reasons exist why SARS would rather opt to attack a transaction in terms of simulation
than the GAAR:
 The subjective intention of parties to a transaction is only vulnerable to attack by SARS
in terms of the simulation doctrine (refer Chapter 5.2.3.1); and
 The ‘purpose’ and ‘normality’ requirements under GAAR poses alternative defences for
the taxpayer, only one of which needs to be absent for the taxpayer to succeed.
However, in terms of simulation, the taxpayer would need to prove the absence of both,
as these requirements are viewed as akin (Chapter 5.2.3.2).
As a result, it may be easier for the taxpayer to escape the GAAR obstacles than it would be the
simulation requirements. These will be discussed in turn below.
5.2.3.1Subjectivity – absent from GAAR
In terms of the old GAAR contained in section 103(1), the ‘sole or main purpose’ requirement
(which is also present in the simulation doctrine, albeit not in that specific wording, if one
accepts that the doctrine has been developed to include this in NWK) have in our courts long
been heralded as being determined by way of a subjective test.148 However, this position seems
to now have changed where the new GAAR is concerned, by virtue of the introduction of section
80G:
‘An avoidance arrangement is presumed to have been entered into or carried out for the
sole or main purpose of obtaining a tax benefit unless and until the party obtaining a tax
benefit proves that, reasonably considered in light of the relevant facts and
circumstances, obtaining a tax benefit was not the sole or main purpose of the
avoidance arrangement.’
Res ipsa loquitur it seems, and Broomberg agrees.149+150 If this is the case, then the entire
GAAR test now rests squarely on objective considerations. This is both interesting and relevant
where simulations are concerned, given that the subjective purpose requirement, which has
now been abandoned by the GAAR, was promptly thereafter recalled for use by NWK, however
this time as part of the common law simulation doctrine.
148 See Secretary for Inland Revenue v Gallagher [1978] 40 SATC 39.
149 Broomberg, E. Then and now – II: The first three prerequisites, Tax Planning, 2007, Vol. 21.
150 The position is also confirmed to be the view of SARS in its Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance and Section 103














Where an intention was present in the parties to a transaction to obtain a tax benefit, this could
in the past have been attacked by SARS under either the common law or under GAAR.
However, this is now only possible in terms of simulation, another reason why this course of
action may seem more lucrative for SARS to explore in future matters before courts. It is
submitted however that this was not the envisaged intention with which the new GAAR was
brought into being.
5.2.3.2Purpose and commercial substance
It is ironic against the backdrop of the NWK judgment to read the following passage from the
SARS draft guide on the GAAR referred to above,151 at 1.4.4:
‘The South African common law “substance over form doctrine” is applied to determine
the true nature of an arrangement. Where a court finds that the legal substance of the
transaction differs from the legal form, it will give effect to the substance.
This doctrine must not be confused with the well established United States of America
(USA) economic substance over form doctrine, (also referred to as the “real economic
substance” doctrine), the effect of which is to some extent introduced into South
Africa‘s anti-avoidance measures by virtue of the commercial substance test contained
in section 80C, read with the purpose requirement.’ (own emphasis)
And it is precisely here where the lines become blurred. From the above it is clear that what
the draft guide discussed the position of simulation to be (with which, it is submitted, most
academic scholars would have had no qualms with) is exactly what the court in NWK did not
apply – the USA ‘real economic substance’ doctrine now not only forms part of the GAAR, but
has ostensibly been applied by the court in NWK as part of the simulation doctrine.
The court in NWK seems to have applied the USA doctrine152 (which has been built into the
GAAR) to simulations – thereby inferring that a lack of commercial substance under simulation
is enough to bring about a purpose to simulate. This perhaps gives context to Lewis JA’s
comments that where a transaction lacks commercial substance, ‘then it will be regarded as
simulated’. It is reiterated that this does not give rise to a deemed simulation.153 However,
what the court seems to have inferred is that, where a transaction with a seemingly other
purpose than to obtain a tax benefit, has no commercial substance then the purpose to simulate
must have been present (except if other objective indicators points to a different subjective
purpose).
151 At 138.
152 Admittedly this has not been done so in name, but it is submitted well so in substance. Refer Lewis JA’s various
comments as to the ‘commercial substance’, ‘business sense’ or ‘business purposes’.














Yet another reason why SARS will always prefer to use the simulation doctrine where available –
not only does it allow for an attack on the subjective intention of the taxpayer, but it also
requires only a lack of commercial/economic substance (as this lacking, under the doctrine,
infers a purpose to simulate)154. However, under the GAAR purpose and commercial substance
are two different requirements, only one of which needs to be absent for the taxpayer to
succeed.
5.3 Transactions affected
From the above analysis (both domestically and internationally) it is evident that there is a
growing movement from the judiciary to expand the simulation doctrine beyond its previous
realms of intentionalist exclusivity. As aptly asserted by Kirby J supra, there are various
reasons for this. The risk flowing from these developments is however that the net of the
doctrine has been cast too wide: not only that it goes beyond the principle laid down in
Randles, referred to above, being that no simulation would be present if ‘the parties honestly
intend(ed) (an agreement) to have effect according to its tenor’, but also that it may go further
than commercial reality, or even common sense.
Philosophically, it may be argued that, as a matter of jurisprudence, where the subjective intent
is present to achieve some tax advantage, the matter is best dealt with under the common law
exclusively, and where the purpose of a transaction is problematic (irrespective whether this is
determined objectively or subjectively) to the fiscus, then the matter should be concluded in
terms of GAAR. However, there is no authority for such a clear-cut approach, nor is it
submitted that it is required. However, the risk arises, where the two remedies of simulation
and GAAR overlap, that the former may be a tool more powerful than the latter. The possible
anomaly lies therein that the GAAR sets the boundaries within which tax planning is condoned
by the Legislature. Where the judiciary however sees itself fit to still disallow certain
transactions within this field of play: that is where the very foundation of the rule of law is at
stake.155 If the development of the simulation doctrine has now intruded into the previously
allowable field of condoned tax planning, it may have done so unintentionally. Irrespective of
this however, this will have practical consequences, and may ironically even go further than
SARS’ itself submits is necessary:156
‘A taxpayer who has carried out a legitimate tax avoidance scheme, i.e. who has
arranged his affairs so as to minimise his tax liability, in a manner which does not
involve fraud, dishonesty, misrepresentation or other actions designed to mislead the
Commissioner, will have met his duties and obligations under the Act...’
154 Support for this notion is found in NWK at 58: ‘Was there any purpose or commercial sense – other than
creating a tax advantage to NWK – for the loan by Slab to NWK to be structured in the way it was?’ (own
emphasis)
155 Refer comments in Chapters 2.2 and 4.1.3, as well as ibid. at 97 & 108.














With the shift in both GAAR and the common law doctrine of simulation in recent years, it is
submitted that various matters before our courts, although the outcome would have been the
same, would have been decided based on the GAAR instead of on grounds of simulation, and
vice versa. However, this is plainly only of academic importance.157 Of practical relevance
however is where these developments would have given a different result altogether to a matter
before the court, had that matter been heard in terms of the law as it currently stands. Clearly,
e.g. Randles would have been decided differently, if the dicta of Lewis JA is anything to go by.
Two other situations, where an arrangement which would have previously been left alone and
may now fall within the tax net, are conceived; examples of which are discussed below.
5.3.1 The corporate veil
In Secretary for Inland Revenue v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert,158 the incorporation of a
partnership was under scrutiny in terms of section 103(1). In essence what the court found
was that both the incorporation of a business is not abnormal, nor was it in this instance done
with the sole or main purpose of obtaining a tax benefit. Therefore, the Secretary’s appeal
failed and the GAAR was not applied to the respondents’ incorporation.
However, for the purposes of conducting a practical study, it is convenient to amend the facts
slightly. What would be the position if, keeping in mind that incorporation of a business is
regarded as being normal, the main purpose of such incorporation was to limit a partnership’s
tax expense?
If under GAAR a partnership, such as in Geustyn’s case, would incorporate, but this for the main
purpose of decreasing its tax liability, then, under both the current and previous GAAR, that
transaction would have been safe, because of the ruling in Geustyn which deems this act to be
normal:
‘Generally speaking, there is nothing abnormal in transferring an existing partnership
business to a company: indeed, such a transaction may, I think, fairly be regarded as
relatively commonplace in the commercial world.’159
A normal transaction removes one of the four pillars required for GAAR to be applied, viz the
presence of abnormality, and thus the GAAR cannot be applied to the facts at hand. Also, in
terms of Watermeyer JA’s simulation test, the incorporation would have been safe. The parties
to the incorporation actually intended to incorporate a company, with all its legal consequences
157 Even the position of penalties in terms of section 76 would be unchanged, as the intention to avoid tax, which is
a requirement for the 200% penalty was also a requirement for the application of either the GAAR (under section
103(1)) or the simulation doctrine.















and obligations attached. This position may however have changed if the true purpose of
incorporation (i.e. to obtain a tax benefit) was concealed.
*****
Example:
Assume A and B operate a successful business, with an annual gross income of less than R14
million. From their tax advisers, they learn of the beneficial tax treatment afforded to ‘small
business corporations’ as defined in section 12E. A and B therefore decides to incorporate their
partnership in order to qualify for the beneficial tax treatment afforded in terms of section 12E.
Although they fully intend to have the partnership incorporated, and also accept the advantages
and consequences of this, not much has changed for them, except that they are happy that the
purpose of the incorporation has come to fruition – a lower tax bill. A and B’s business still
continue in exactly the same fashion as before and they each take home as much as before,
irrespective thereof that their accountant now shows their drawings in the books as a dividend.
Further, when asked by SARS why the business was incorporated, it was stated that the main
purpose was to limit the liability of the erstwhile partners. (Although in fact this was a
consideration for A and B, this was not the main purpose.)
*****
Due to the normality requirement in the GAAR, the above incorporation will not be subject
thereto. However, as regards to simulation, it is an altogether different matter. Even though
the incorporation was carried out as intended by the parties, the fact that they in effect still
trade as before and because of the tainted purpose with which they are doing so in the form of
a company, the absurdity arises that a legislated provision, designed to stimulate business, may
be haltered by the common law. Clearly, such a position is untenable. With the above example
in mind, the irony arises that where the purpose of the incorporation had not been concealed,
neither the simulation doctrine nor the GAAR would have applied. Only by virtue of the fact that
the purpose with incorporation had been concealed, does the simulation principle apply.
Where the above is the result in terms of the doctrine as it stands, one sympathises with Lord
Russell of Killowen in his judgment in the Duke of Westminster’s case at 25:
‘If ... the doctrine means that you may brush aside deeds, disregard the legal rights and
liabilities arising under a contract between parties, and decide the question of taxability
or non-taxability upon the footing of the rights and liabilities of the parties being














5.3.2 Loans without terms of repayment
Another arrangement which may be affected is a loan account with no fixed terms of
repayment. These arrangements are so commonplace in South African commerce that it would
be ambitious to suggest that these are abnormal.
*****
Example:
A owns a beach house in the Western Cape. Knowing that it is prudent for estate duty purposes
to freeze the capital growth of this asset by rather transferring the house to a family trust, of
which he is both one of the trustees and a beneficiary, he swiftly makes arrangements for the
sales transaction to be actioned. After A sold the house to the trust, very few things in practice
however change: A and his family still visit the house once a month and no rent is charged to
him by the trust for his use thereof.
While both the trust and A intended to transfer ownership of the house to the trust, the trust’s
real purpose or commercial reason for entering into the arrangement was genuinely to acquire
ownership of the property.
*****
The above transaction is one which is often witnessed. It is also one which is not affected by
the GAAR, as income tax is not at stake, and Watermeyer JA’s simulation test would also not
have applied – the parties intended the sales contracts to have effect according to its tenor.
However, insofar as A’s purpose for the transaction is concerned, it is clear from the above that
the purpose or motive of the transaction was mainly to acquire some tax benefit. And this can
be deduced from various commercial factors (as is prescribed by NWK to determine purpose):
 The house was probably sold at cost (less than its market value so as to not result in
capital gains tax for A);
 No rent is charged for the use of the house;
 The utilities accounts are likely still sent to A’s residential address; and
 The loan account on which the house has been sold would in all probability carry no
interest or terms of repayment.
5.3.3 Conclusion
Although the knell is sound for the above two arrangements as examples of what might possibly














submitted that this is an unintentional result of the current formulation thereof. Even though it
is evident from the above analysis that the incorporation of a business and loans with no terms
of repayment may give rise to the application of the simulation doctrine, it is submitted that this
should not be allowed to fall within the scope of the common law doctrine, and that its
formulation should be curbed accordingly. However, given that the law as such was laid down
by the Supreme Court of Appeal, this may set dangerous authority for future application by
lower courts, as will be discussed in Chapter 5.4. In the words of Lord Hoffmann:160
‘There is no need for such spooky jurisprudence.’
In the recent ‘SHIPS 2’ judgment,161 both the court a quo and the court of appeal lamented its
decision to let the taxpayer walk free, despite a scheme employed deliberately for the purposes
of avoiding tax of some GBP 24 million. This loss suffered by HMRC was one of the reasons that
the Aaronson study group was commissioned to comment on the advisability of introducing a
GAAR in the UK.162 In his concurring judgment, Thomas LJ at 100 comments:
‘The higher-rate taxpayers with large earnings or significant investment income who
have taken advantage of the scheme have received benefits that cannot possibly have
been intended and which must be paid for by other taxpayers. It must be for Parliament
to consider the wider implications of the decision as it relates to the way in which
revenue legislation is structured and drafted.’
In South Africa now perhaps the risk exists that the converse may be exploited to the detriment
of the taxpayer.
5.4 Stare decisis: the future application of NWK
It remains to be seen if simulation doctrine, which it is advanced has been developed as
envisaged in Chapter 3.3, would be applied as such – no court has yet had the opportunity to
comment on the judgment. It has been suggested separately by Vorster, Broomberg and
Emslie163 that the comments perceived to extend the simulation test (specifically with reference
to the requirement for a real purpose and commercial substance to be present) were made as
obiter. Williams164 and Silke165 however disagree.166
160 Norglen Ltd (in liquidation) v Reeds Rains Prudential Ltd & others [1998] 1 All ER 218 at 226.
161 Mayes v HMRC [2011] EWCA Civ 407.
162 Refer Chapter 4.1.2.
163 Ibid. at 83.
164 Ibid at 84.
165 Ibid. at 88.














Irrespective of this, as has been conceded by both Emslie167 and Williams,168 even if the
comments referred to above were merely part of the obiter dicta of the judgment, these would
still carry considerable weight in lower courts, e.g. tax courts.169 It is submitted that it would
carry even more weight if simulation was at issue when one is in settlement negotiations with
SARS.
In Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association v Harrison,170 the Constitutional Court
held as follows regarding the doctrine of stare decisis:
‘What (the doctrine of stare decisis) boils down to... is: “certainty, predictability,
reliability, equality, uniformity, convenience: these are the principal advantages to be
gained by a legal system from the principle of stare decisis.” Observance of the
doctrine has been insisted upon, both by this Court and by the Supreme Court of
Appeal. And I believe rightly so. The doctrine of precedent not only binds lower courts
but also binds courts of final jurisdiction to their own decisions. These courts can depart
from a previous decision of their own only when satisfied that that decision is clearly
wrong. Stare decisis is therefore not simply a matter of respect for courts of higher
authority. It is a manifestation of the rule of law itself, which in turn is a founding value
of our Constitution. To deviate from this rule is to invite legal chaos.’
And in Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security: In re S v Walters at 61:171
‘High courts (and tax courts) are obliged to follow legal interpretations of the SCA,
whether they relate to constitutional issues or to other issues, and remain so obliged
unless and until the SCA itself decides otherwise...’
It has been observed by some that in reaching its decision, the SCA itself did not observe this
principle.172 In this regard, in Robin Consolidated Industries Ltd v Commissioner for Inland
Revenue173 it was held that:
‘Particularly is it important to observe stare decisis when a decision has been acted on
for a number of years in such a manner that rights have grown up under it.’
167 Ibid at 7.
168 Williams, RC, The role of the doctrine of stare decisis, PwC South Africa Synopsis Tax Today, September 2011.
169 Refer also to Mazansky, E, And you thought an obiter dictum was not binding! The Taxpayer, March 2012, Vol.
61, No. 3 at 44.
170 [2011] (2) BCLR 121 (CC) at 28.
171 [2002] (7) BCLR 663 (CC).
172 Broomberg ibid. at 34.














However, whether the SCA did have regard to its own previous judgments in NWK is beyond the
matter currently at hand. What is relevant however is that if the above is to be adhered to,
NWK’s effect will remain until the SCA itself has had the opportunity to direct otherwise. In this
regard, Vorster hopes that ‘the Supreme Court of Appeal will soon be given the opportunity to
re-assess its judgment in NWK and to clarify its effect on the legal principles of simulation.’174
The possibility also exists that a court may in future seek to distinguish from the facts of NWK in
an attempt to escape having to comment on NWK or to have the arduous duty of interpreting
the judgment. This is again the view of Vorster who comments that the facts in NWK are both
unusual and specific and that a court should only be bound to NWK to the extent that these
facts are closely resembled. In support of this assertion, he refers to Hippo Quaries175 where it
was held that:
‘These factors are, of course, all absent in the present case. In my view Skjelbreds’ case
is clearly distinguishable from the present one on the facts and to the extent that the
enquiry into the intention of the parties to the cession is a purely factual one the
reasoning and the remarks of this court in Skjelbreds’ case must be confined to cases in
which its facts are substantially duplicated.’
Of course the above is a judicial reality that lower courts, in an attempt to escape the judicial
straightjacket of the stare decisis doctrine, seek to distinguish the facts of the matter before it
from the precedent from which they seek to be liberated. The question however is whether
they are justified in doing so. The problem with using Hippo Quaries as justification for
Vorster’s assertion, is that, as is evident from the above, the enquiry into the intention of any
person is purely factual.
Now, it is true that a court is entitled to distinguish on matters of fact (as for instance which
factors are required to ascertain intent). A lower court is however unable to distinguish on
matters of legal principle. It is not submitted that Skjelbred’s case was incorrectly distinguished
from. It is however submitted that a lower court would not be able to distinguish from NWK as
to what constitutes a simulation. The former is a question fact, the latter a question of law.
Since the proposition of this paper is to assert that the test for the simulation doctrine has
changed in NWK, it is further submitted that this test has not been made in obiter, nor was it
made based on fact. As such, it has changed the simulation test with permanent effect and one
which in law is required to be adhered to by lower courts, at least until the SCA is afforded the
opportunity to dictate otherwise.
174 Ibid. at 38.
















‘If it looks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it probably is a
duck.’176
Had the test for what a simulated transaction is been that easy.
It is evident that the NWK-decision has brought about widespread comment, and even criticism.
As Emslie points out:177
‘While it seems to us that the outcome of NWK was correct, due to the legal effect of
confusio, we respectfully question whether there was any true simulation at all...’
It is submitted that not only did the principle of confusio apply to the facts in NWK, but its
English derogative was also present in the mind of various tax scholars subsequently, rightly or
wrongly so. What is certain, however, is that the decision in NWK will influence the way forward
in which taxpayers and SARS alike more carefully scrutinise transactions entered into for their
‘commercial reasons’.
As was discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, it appears that the contents of the simulation doctrine
may have been changed with at least some degree of permanency: no longer is an intention to
deceive by both parties the only requirement, but a second tier has also been added to the test:
is the purpose of the transaction for any one party, subjectively determined, to obtain a tax
benefit rather than the purpose/motive which is portrayed to the world? Otherwise stated: was
there either an intention or a purpose to simulate?
Examples of transactions of this sort which may now fall foul of the common law doctrine, which
would not have been the case pre-NWK have been illustrated in Chapter 5 above, as well as
how the GAAR has until now not afforded the fiscus protection against these. From the common
law comparison performed with the GAAR, it would seem that SARS may prefer to attack tax
avoidance in terms of the simulation doctrine rather than in terms of the GAAR where the facts
allow therefor. As commented however above, this sets a dangerous precedent if the common
law doctrine’s application submits certain transactions to tax which the Legislature did not
intend should have happened. Looking to the future with one of SARS’ anti-avoidance weapons
176 Author unknown.














been strengthened, taxpayers should be more vigilant than ever before entering into disputes
with SARS, if SARS’ winning rate in the court is anything to go by at least.178
The fact of the matter is that the tax landscape has changed. To what degree however, it
seems that there remains uncertainty amongst various renowned academic writers. The
recommendation is therefore that at the earliest possible stage the judiciary acknowledges the
confusion that reigns regarding simulated transactions and move to address this by clarifying
matters as to the correct approach which should be taken where possible simulated transactions
are concerned. Although it has been submitted in this paper that the test for simulated
transactions may entail a test which diverges from the view of others, this emphasises the
various perspectives which are held in this regard, and are symptomatic of general legal
uncertainty regarding the matter. Indeed, it is submitted that it is one of the functions of the
judiciary to provide legal certainty. Therefore, the opportunity to provide clarity should be
embraced at the first opportunity which is presented.
However, it is not the role of the judiciary only to promote legal certainty, but also that of the
State, i.e. SARS where matters of tax are involved. The recommendation would therefore also
be that SARS goes further than merely issuing a media release on the matter. An interpretation
note at the very least is necessitated to present SARS’ view on NWK. Irrespective of the
perceived accuracy of this, it will at least afford taxpayers the opportunity to understand what it
is that they should guard against in exercising their entrenched right of effective tax planning
within the bounds of the law.
Finally, it is both the aim of this paper as well as a recommendation thereof, that taxpayers and
tax planners alike take cognisance of the ever-changing tax environment. One is so used to
limiting this to legislative changes that sight is lost of changes in the common law. Even if the
views taken in this paper are not agreed with, they purport to act as a warning to taxpayers of
what the consequences of the simulation doctrine in the common law as regards the law of
taxation may be.
The importance of understanding the crisp test and contents of the simulation doctrine is
highlighted by the rather ominous Media Statement released by SARS shortly after the NWK-
judgment had been delivered:
‘SARS is aware that a number of other taxpayers have entered into simulated
transactions, including compulsorily convertible loans similar to the one at issue in the
NWK case, with the effect of artificially reducing their tax liabilities. Starting from 15
February 2011 SARS will commence audits of these taxpayers.’
178 According to a pwc document published, Creating opportunities in tough times: Budget 2012, SARS in 2010














From the above, it would seem that it was both Soccer fans and SARS alike who were afforded
the opportunity in 2010 to exclaim, ‘Ke nako!’
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